Pain conditions

Why I don’t trust my clinical reasoning: and why this matters


“See someone experienced” I hear people with pain say. “They’ll know what’s wrong with you.”

Well, based on the research I’ve read, I wouldn’t be so sure. In fact, I’m certain my own clinical reasoning is biased, prone to errors that I don’t notice, and influenced by factors that most clinicians would be horrified to think they, too, were influenced by.

Let me give you a few to ponder:

I’m interested in women and pain – and there’s a lot of evidence showing that women’s pain doesn’t get the same kind of diagnostic and management attention as men. Now part of this is due to the inherent bias in research where experimental studies often rely on male rats, mice and undergraduates because they don’t have those pesky hormonal fluctuations each month. Even volunteering to take part in a pain study has been found to be biased – people who volunteer have been shown to be more risk-taking and more extraverted (Skinner, 1982) – though to be fair this is an old study!

But contextual factors such as gender, distress and even the supposed diagnosis do influence judgements about pain intensity (Bernardes & Lima, 2011) including potentially life-threatening chest pain (Keogh, Hamid, Hamid & Ellery, 2004). Gender bias has been identified in a large literature review of gender bias in healthcare and gendered norms towards people with chronic pain (Samulowitz, Gremyr, Eriksson & Hensing, 2018).

And if you have the misfortune to be judged to have low trustworthiness and you’re a woman, you’re more likely to be thought to have less pain and to be exaggerating your pain (Schafer, Prkachin, Kaseweter & Williams, 2016). Beware if you’re overweight and a woman because you’ll be likely judged as having less intense pain, the pain will be judged as less interfering, more exaggerated and less related to “medical” factors – women’s pain in particular is likely to be judged as “psychological” and given psychological therapy rather than other treatments (Miller, Allison, Trost, De Ruddere, Wheelis, Goubert & Hirsch, 2018).

The weird thing is that the clinicians involved in these studies were oblivious to their bias. And let’s not even go there with people of colour or so-called “minority” groups such as LGBTQI.

So as clinicians our initial impressions of a person can lead us astray – and I haven’t even started with the contribution experience has on clinical reasoning. Let me go there then!

Something that cognitive psychologists have explored for some years now, is the type of thinking that we draw on for clinical reasoning. System one is “fast reasoning” – where we rapidly, instinctively and emotionally make decisions on the fly. Kahneman (1982) first described these two processes and noted that fast thinking gets better with rehearsal and are helpful especially for skilled clinicians needing to make decisions in pressured contexts, and draw on “pattern recognition” – or to be precise, draw on deviation from a recognised pattern (Preisz, 2019). System two is “slow reasoning” where decisions are made in a considered way, are not influenced by emotional state, and can be thought of as “rational.” Slow thinking is most useful where the situation is complex, where decisions need to weigh multiple pieces of information, where the situation might be novel, or where, for persistent pain in particular, there are multiple disease processes occurring.

OK, so we should choose system two, right? Not so fast! System one is hard to switch from – it’s what underpins “intuition” or “hunches” – and it gets more entrenched the more experienced we are. According to Preisz (2019), system one “seeks to form a coherent, plausible story by relying on association, memories, pattern matching and assumption.”

Why is system one thinking not so great? Well, we’re human. We’re human in the way we respond to any reasoning situation – we anchor on the first and most “plausible” ideas, and these might be unrelated to the actual presentation we see. For example, if we’ve been reading a journal article on a new treatment and its indications, it’s amazing how many people will present with those exact same indications in the next week! This is availability bias or anchoring bias. We’re also inclined to believe our own patients and judgements are different from “those people” – especially “those people” who might respond best to clinical guidelines. This means that even in the face of clear-cut research showing the lack of effects of knee arthroscopy (Brignardello-Petersen, Guyatt, Buchbinder, Poolman et al, 2017) an orthopaedic surgeon I know argued that “we choose our patients very carefully” – essentially arguing that his patients are different, and this approach is the best one.

If experienced clinicians find it hard to “unstick” from old practice, or move quickly to “intuitive” reasoning (even if it’s called “pattern recognition”), and if we all find it hard to recognise when we’re biased, or even that we are biased, what on earth should we do? All us old hands should retire maybe? All follow algorithms and not use “clinical judgement”? Take the “human” out of clinical management and use AI?

Some of these things might work. There is evidence that algorithms and AI can offer effective and (perhaps) less biased diagnosis and management than our unaided human brain (Kadhim, 2018) but there are also studies showing that direct comparisons between decision aids and clinical judgement are rarely made, and those that have been carried out don’t show superior results (Schriger, Elder, & Cooper, 2017). But watch this space: AI is a rapidly developing area and I predict greater use of this over time.

The risk with decision aids is – garbage in, garbage out. If we look at existing research we can see that male, pale and potentially stale dominates: this doesn’t bode well for people of colour, for women, for the unique and idiosyncratic combination of diseases a person can have, or for untangling the impact of disease on the person – in other words, disability and illness.

So, to summarise. We are all biased, and it’s best to acknowledge this to ourselves upfront and personal. We can then turn to strategies that may reduce the biases. For me, the one I turn to most often is a case formulation, using information gathered from a semi-structured interview and a standard set of questionnaires. These have been developed a priori so my biases in information gathering are limited. By taking time to follow a case formulation, my thinking is slowed to that more deliberative system two. At least some of the biases I know I’m prone to are mitigated.

And yet, I know I am biased. That’s why I use a supervision relationship to help me identify those biases, to be challenged and to reflect.

Bernardes, S. F., & Lima, M. L. (2011, Dec). A contextual approach on sex-related biases in pain judgements: The moderator effects of evidence of pathology and patients’ distress cues on nurses’ judgements of chronic low-back pain. Psychology & Health, 26(12), 1642-1658.

Brignardello-Petersen, R., Guyatt, G. H., Buchbinder, R., Poolman, R. W., Schandelmaier, S., Chang, Y., Sadeghirad, B., Evaniew, N., & Vandvik, P. O. (2017, May 11). Knee arthroscopy versus conservative management in patients with degenerative knee disease: a systematic review. BMJ Open, 7(5), e016114. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-016114

Kadhim, M. A. (2018). FNDSB: A fuzzy-neuro decision support system for back pain diagnosis. Cognitive Systems Research, 52, 691-700. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2018.08.021

Kahneman, D., Slovic, S. P., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge university press.

Keogh, E., Hamid, R., Hamid, S., & Ellery, D. (2004). Investigating the effect of anxiety sensitivity, gender and negative interpretative bias on the perception of chest pain. Pain, 111(1-2), 209-217.

Miller, M. M., Allison, A., Trost, Z., De Ruddere, L., Wheelis, T., Goubert, L., & Hirsh, A. T. (2018, Jan). Differential Effect of Patient Weight on Pain-Related Judgements About Male and Female Chronic Low Back Pain Patients. J Pain, 19(1), 57-66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2017.09.001

Preisz, A. (2019, Jun). Fast and slow thinking; and the problem of conflating clinical reasoning and ethical deliberation in acute decision-making. Journal of Paediatric Child Health, 55(6), 621-624. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpc.14447

Samulowitz, A., Gremyr, I., Eriksson, E., & Hensing, G. (2018). “Brave Men” and “Emotional Women”: A Theory-Guided Literature Review on Gender Bias in Health Care and Gendered Norms towards Patients with Chronic Pain. Pain Research and Management, 2018.

Schafer, G., Prkachin, K. M., Kaseweter, K. A., & Williams, A. C. (2016, Aug). Health care providers’ judgments in chronic pain: the influence of gender and trustworthiness. Pain, 157(8), 1618-1625. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000536

Schriger, D. L., Elder, J. W., & Cooper, R. J. (2017, Sep). Structured Clinical Decision Aids Are Seldom Compared With Subjective Physician Judgment, and Are Seldom Superior. Ann Emerg Med, 70(3), 338-344 e333. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annemergmed.2016.12.004

Skinner, N. F. (1982, 1982/12/01). Personality characteristics of volunteers for painful experiments. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 20(6), 299-300. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03330107

Knowledge gaps for working together


Whenever we work with someone living with pain, we form a team. A team, by definition, is “a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively towards a common and valued goal/objective/mission” (Salas et al., 1992). So while many clinicians work outside an interprofessional team, they are always working in a team consisting of at least the person with pain, and themselves.

There’s a good deal of research on teamwork, and a heap of references in pain management literature on the benefits and, indeed, the need, to work in a team for best outcomes (both in terms of effects for the person and in terms of cost-effectiveness). Gilliam and colleagues (2018) demonstrate that long-term outcomes are retained by participants attending an interdisciplinary pain rehabilitation programme, while Guildford and colleaguees (2018) also showed reductions in analgesic use during an interdisciplinary pain management programme. It’s not new news folks!

Teamwork is well-investigated in health, particularly interprofessional/interdisciplinary teamwork. Much of this research, however, is focused on nursing and medicine interactions, with rather less attention paid to allied health and nursing/medicine teamwork. This matters because while nursing and medicine are moving away from the old medical model, the professions probably represent the two most similar in terms of clinical models. And this matters because one thing that’s found to be important for good teamwork in health is having a shared mental model (for example – from operation room – Wilson, 2019).

All good so far – nothing new here, move along, right?

Hold it right there, folks.

You see, when we work together in a team, particularly for people with persistent pain, we often generate a heap of new information about the person we hope to help. In New Zealand, the person will have completed the ePPOC set of questionnaires, then there will probably have been some physical performance testing, maybe some basic ROM, and muscle testing, perhaps some daily life functioning tasks, certainly some more psychological questionnaires, if the person sees a medical practitioner, there will be the obligatory bloods, urine, perhaps imaging – you know what I mean! A heap of information that each clinician deems necessary and I haven’t yet gone into each clinician’s desire to “hear the story from the beginning again!”

What’s lacking in our research on teamwork in persistent pain is discussion about how we assemble this information so that we move from a multidisciplinary team – Multidisciplinary teams involve people from different health disciplines working alongside one another while using clinical models drawn from their own professional discipline (Körner, 2010) – to an interprofessional/interdisciplinary team – Interdisciplinary teams also involve people from different health disciplines working alongside one another but meet regularly to collaborate on treatment goals and priorities (Ruan & Kaye, 2016). There is limited hierarchy and considerable communication, cooperation and often overlap between team members (Körner, 2010).

Not only a lack of a shared mental model (because we all think our model is The Best), we also lack an understanding of team processes. How do we develop an effective way to communicate, to cooperate, to deal with conflict in an open and creative way, to coordinate our work so things happen at the right time, to be coached so that the team-as-a-whole moves in the same direction and new people coming to the team feel part of the culture? Not forgetting that teams work in an ever-changing context, and team membership changes over time, while the overall team culture is something that emerges from a team collective (Salas, et al., 2015).

Are pain rehabilitation teams different from teams working in older person’s health, or palliative care, or as part of a primary health team?

I suspect so, but I can’t find good research detailing how our pain teams are different. It’s like a black box of mystery (a bit like interprofessional pain management programmes – one murky black box out of which a person pops!)

I’m left with this feeling that because teams in pain management and rehabilitation have become scarce in most part of the US, and that this is where all the research funding lives, there’s not very much that we actually know. We don’t know who holds the positions of power – is it the medical practitioner? the psychologist? the physiotherapist? the occupational therapist? Who makes the call as to when it’s time to work with the person to move from pain reduction to living well alongside pain? Are the team members actually using a common model or are they really working in parallel? And how can a team be maintained over time – I’ve had the privilege of working in a very close-knit and effective team for some years, but I’ve seen that team become smaller, fragmented, more multidisciplinary than interprofessional, with limited attention to processes of induction, developing effective conflict management, and really becoming weakened.

There is one conclusion I can draw from the mountains of material I’ve been learning and it’s this: it’s impossible to put a bunch of clinicians together and call them a team without putting effort in to develop those processes I’ve listed above. And when was the last time you attended a CPD session on “how to work in a team?”

Gilliam, W. P., Craner, J. R., Cunningham, J. L., Evans, M. M., Luedtke, C. A., Morrison, E. J., Sperry, J. A., & Loukianova, L. L. (2018). Longitudinal Treatment Outcomes for an Interdisciplinary Pain Rehabilitation Program: Comparisons of Subjective and Objective Outcomes on the Basis of Opioid Use Status. J Pain, 19(6), 678-689. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2018.02.010

Guildford, B. J., Daly-Eichenhardt, A., Hill, B., Sanderson, K., & McCracken, L. M. (2018). Analgesic reduction during an interdisciplinary pain management programme: treatment effects and processes of change. Br J Pain, 12(2), 72-86. https://doi.org/10.1177/2049463717734016

Körner, M. (2010). Interprofessional teamwork in medical rehabilitation: a comparison of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary team approach. Clinical Rehabilitation, 24(8), 745-755. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269215510367538

Ruan, X., & Kaye, A. D. (2016). A Call for Saving Interdisciplinary Pain Management. J Orthop Sports Phys Ther, 46(12), 1021-1023. https://doi.org/10.2519/jospt.2016.0611

Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S. A., & Tannenbaum, S. I. (1992). Toward an understanding of team performance and training. In Teams: Their training and performance. (pp. 3-29). Ablex Publishing.

Salas, E., Shuffler, M. L., Thayer, A. L., Bedwell, W. L., & Lazzara, E. H. (2015). Understanding and Improving Teamwork in Organizations: A Scientifically Based Practical Guide. Human Resource Management, 54(4), 599-622. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.21628

Wilson, A. (2019). Creating and applying shared mental models in the operating room. Journal of Perioperative Nursing, 32(3), 33.

The stigma of being a woman in pain


Women, it is often thought, must be much tougher than men when it comes to dealing with pain – after all, don’t women have babies without anaesthetic? Don’t men faint at the sight of a needle?

Ummmm, not quite so fast. Now before I begin, in this post I’m referring to cis-gender females, and in the experiments, participants were selected on the basis that they believed that negative gender discrimination was a thing. And as I write this post, I want to be clear that sometimes we have to begin with a very simplified model before research can be conducted on a much more messy cohort – and that this doesn’t negate the incredibly harmful and known effects of gender discrimination, and trans/inter/queer experiences. I can only hope that by starting this kind of research, as a community we’ll begin to understand the terrible impact that stigma has on people.

This paper investigated whether stigma related to one’s identity influenced the perception of nociceptive stimulation. It’s written off the back of earlier research showing that when people are excluded socially, their experience of nociceptive stimulation was greater (ie people didn’t need as much stimulation for it to be perceived as painful) (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman & Naliboff, 2006). Other studies have shown that people with low back pain who perceive themselves as stigmatised reported greater pain intensity, and that stigmatisation is the main source of social consequences for this group of people (Zhang, Barreto & Doyle, 2020).

These researchers (Zhang, Zhang, Li, Hu, Kong & Su, 2021) conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that stigmatised women would experience greater pain intensity with nociceptive stimulation.
The first experiment used tonic cold pain (cold pressor test) in participants who had already been selected because they believed they had been stigmatised as a woman, asked them to immerse their hand in icy cold water (1 degree C) for as long as they could (to a maximum of 3 minutes), then take part in a mock online job interview. Some of the participants were told that was the end of the study; another group were told they were successful in the interview; and a third group were told that “woman are generally not suitable candidates for these kinds of jobs”; and the final group were simply told “you didn’t get the job” with no reason given. The latter three groups then underwent another cold pressor test as before. And finally they were all debriefed.

The researchers found that those who were told “women are generally not suitable for this kind of work” did feel more stigmatised than the others, and not only reported more sensitivity to cold (threshold) but also showed lower tolerance to the pain experienced in the cold pressor test.

The second experiment involved women who were selected as above. This group of women were shown images downloaded from Google – one set was of content showing devaluing of women, while another set were control or neutral images. The authors used a heat stimulation this time, and randomly showed either neutral or stigmatising images just before the heat was applied. Participants rated the pain after each stimulation.

The results of this experiment showed that when participants were shown the stigmatising content, they reported higher pain intensity from the same nociceptive stimulation. In other words – stigma-inducing images led to these women reporting more pain when given the same amount of heat stimulus.

Not content with this, the researchers conducted a third experiment, this time examining nociceptive-evoked brain responses. They used the same experimental design as for the second experiment, but instead of self-reporting, participants had EEG signals recorded during each heat stimulation.

The results of this experiment once again showed that when participants were shown stigmatising images, they rated their pain experience more highly, and that this was reflected in the EEG results they obtained. N1 amplitude and P2 latency in time and LEP magnitude in the time-frequency domain were influenced by the stigmatising cues.

What does this all mean?

Well, for one thing it’s nice to see research being conducted in women (there’s a bit of a bias against women being involved in basic science pain research because of that pesky old hormone thing – see Samuloitz, Gremyr, Eriksson & Hensing (2018) for more). And for a study to have positive findings.

I’m particularly interested in the brain responses – simply by manipulating the sense of stigma, the same nociceptive stimulation was processed differently. Now this isn’t the same as saying “psychological factors cause pain” because this study is not looking at that – nociceptive stimulation was included – but the same nociceptive stimulation was prioritised in parts of the brain usually active in emotional responses, while P2 is an area involved in the “advanced stage of perceptual processing” was activated sooner in the stigmatised manipulation than in the control condition. The authors argue that because stigma is a threat to sense of self, and because this sense of threat can lead to vigilance about potentially stigmatising cues, greater attentional processing is allocated to threat information, and this in turn, enhances the experience of pain. The greater N1 amplitude demonstrate that attention was drawn to stigmatising material and then influenced the subsequent nociceptive information.

Let’s take a moment to consider the implications of this. Many women have reported their feelings of being devalued both because of their gender as well as their reports of pain. Women may be told “there’s no cure for being a woman” and given inadequate pain relief for period pain (true story). Women do report more pain, are more likely to develop persistent pain, and seek help for pain more readily than men. The latter can be seen as a bad thing – shouldn’t we just “cope”?

Implicit attitudes towards women remain throughout our society, despite the efforts of Kate Sheppard who was one of the women who worked so hard to enable women to vote (in New Zealand, in 19 September 1893). People with pain are also often stigmatised. My post last week is intriguing in that I pointed out that we cannot determine who is, or isn’t, “faking”. It’s the only post I’ve had with nearly 40 votes, but a total score of 2/5. It’s unplatable to some to think that a subjective experience is just that – subjective, not able to be measured, and for clinicians, that we need to accept what a person says without judgement. Stigma is judgement – let’s not do it.

N. I. Eisenberger, J. M. Jarcho, M. D. Lieberman, and B. D. Naliboff, (2006)“An experimental study of shared sensitivity to physical pain and social rejection,” Pain, 126(1), pp. 132– 138.

Samulowitz, A., Gremyr, I., Eriksson, E., & Hensing, G. (2018). “Brave men” and “emotional women”: A theory-guided literature review on gender bias in health care and gendered norms towards patients with chronic pain. Pain Research and Management, 2018.

Waugh, O. C., Byrne, D. G., & Nicholas, M. K. (2014). Internalized stigma in people living with chronic pain. The Journal of Pain, 15(5), 550-e1.

M. Zhang, M. Barreto, and D. Doyle, (2020) “Stigma-based rejection experiences affect trust in others,” Social Psychological and Personality Science, 11(3), pp. 308–316, 2020.

Zhang, M., Zhang, Y., Li, Z., Hu, L., Kong, Y., & Su, J. (2021). Sexism-Related Stigma Affects Pain Perception. Neural Plasticity, 2021, 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/6612456

Why do people with pain report differently on questionnaires than they do in physical performance testing?


One of the topics thrown around by people who don’t have an up-to-date understanding of pain is why people say one thing on a questionnaire, for example, what they can and can’t do, and perform quite differently when asked to do the same task in a clinic. It’s a good question, on the face of it: after all, people should know what they can and can’t do, and be consistent. If there is a difference, well obviously the physical performance test is far more objective than self-report – the therapist is right there watching, so there’s no room for doubt about which measure is The Most Accurate.

The main reason, according to these clinicians, for someone doing differently in the clinic compared with self-reporting, has to be because they’re biased. The person wants to misrepresent what they can and can’t do. Of course.

Superficially, and if you’re not knowledgeable about pain, behaviour, context and human interaction, you could be forgiven for accepting the idea that what you see in clinic is consistent with what’s being done in every day life. The physical movements are pretty much the same and the person is just being asked to do something they do all the time.

BUT – and it’s an enormous exception – humans are not robots. Not body bits that move when they’re pulled like a puppet on a string. People are meaning making, interpreting, social creatures with rapidly responding body systems that represent contexts in relation to memories, predictions and current demands.

I wrote a talk recently on some research that made my heart sing a bit. As an occupational therapist, my profession has long recognised that doing activities (occupations) that hold meaning is quite a different thing from doing a-contextual, meaningless movements. This is why occupational therapists are known to ask about what matters to you, and to use meaningful activities/occupations both as therapy and as outcome (Hitch & Pepin, 2021). The research I referred to was a proposal for an “ecologically grounded functional practice” within rehabilitation (Vaz, Silva, Mancini, Carello & Kinsella-Shaw, 2017). In this paper, the authors point out that “improvements at one level of functioning might not transfer immediately to other levels” and by this they mean that elbow flexion/extension improvements may not transfer into a person being able to feed themselves. They also pointed out that when people perform well-rehearsed activities in the context of goal pursuit – such as getting dressed, ready for work; catching a ball as part of a fast-moving game of netball; hammering a nail – the movements are not just about motor control, they’re about goal-directed behaviour in a context with an interaction between the person, the environment, any tools, the purpose of the activity and so on.

For example, if I want to eat soup, I not only need to have sufficient elbow flexion/extension, I also need to know where the soup bowl is (tried eating soup while lying down?), the texture of the soup (is it thick, thin, lumpy?), the heat of the soup (hot, cold, spicy) and even the social context – I might be OK slurping when I’m on my own, but I’m less inclined to slurp when in polite company. The way in which I carry out the flexion/extension will be very different with each contextual variation.

OK. So context matters, and both the what and why of movement will influence how I go about my performance.
What else?

Well, with a painful condition and especially when I’m not confident I can do it without increasing my pain, I’m much more likely to attempt a difficult movement task in the presence of someone who can monitor what I’m doing. Firstly that person might stop me if they think I’m doing something harmful (professional liability insurance offers some protection!). Secondly, it’s a lot harder to say “no” to someone who is right there in the room! This is called “demand characteristics” and has been associated with problems of the rubber hand illusion (Lush, Vazier & Holcombe, 2020). If someone expects you to do something, you’ll probably do it – because we social creatures don’t like to offend, because the person may inadvertently signal the response they want (see link).

There are other reasons people don’t report the same level of disability on a questionnaire and in physical performance testing: they don’t measure the same things, people forget (especially if they haven’t tried in a while), the day of physical performance testing could be a bad day (or a good day), in physical performance testing the person is usually asked to do it maybe once or twice – in daily life that same activity might be carried out many times across a day, week, month. The environment in a clinical testing environment is typically well-lit, the space around the person is clear, the noise level is usually reasonably low, the floor surface is flat and usually hard lino and free of rugs or pets, there’s minimal distraction, the only thing the person has to think of is this one movement – they’re not picking up the washing off the floor while rushing to put it in the washing machine before dashing out the door to pick the kids up from school.

Even the questions are different – “does pain interfere with…?” is a different question from “can you step up onto this step using a hand rail?”

And don’t let me even start on the meaning of performance either way – for example, if the person is really keen on getting knee surgery, might “good” performance mean they, without even knowing it, alter how they do a movement? What if the person is apprehensive about how the results of this testing might affect their rehabilitation and return to work – again without even knowing it, might this not have some influence on how the person performs?

Testing and measurement is a core skill and research area in psychology. Dang, King & Inzlicht (2020) offer some really good insights into the reasons responses differ between self-report and performance, and to be fair, they don’t even consider the influence of pain and physical capability as I have above. Pain-related performance is a specialty area of its own, nonetheless we can still draw from their paper because many of the problems they recount are absolutely part of pain and disability self-report and physical performance.

They describe the reliability paradox (that reliability = variance between individuals divided by variance between individuals + error variance) – in other words, we need low levels of between-person variability so that any experimental manipulation is maximised. But in real life, we almost always exhibit variability in our performance – so the reliability of two measures limits the correlations that can be observed between then, with lower reliability leading to weaker observed correlations.

The authors also describe the very different response processes involved in self report and performance – as I mentioned above, self-report measures ask people to reflect on what they do in real life in many different contexts that are unstructured. Performance measures take a snapshot based on performance in specific and highly structured situations. Self-report measures capture a person’s perception of their capabilities whereas physical performance reflects the observations of someone else. And performance assessments generally tap into peak performance, not daily performance – tapping into some of the discrepancies we see between “can do” and “will do” (competence-performance discrepancy).

So, when you read arguments on social media from well-known physiotherapists suggesting that the person who reports a difference between what they perceive they can do, and what they have done in a physical performance test is “biased”: know that we have absolutely NO WAY to determine “bias”, “malingering”, “faking bad”, “faking good” – and that there are many well-understood reasons for the difference in performance. Read this paper for more on why we can’t detect “malingering” in people with pain: Tuck, N. L., Johnson, M. H., & Bean, D. J. (2019, Feb). You’d Better Believe It: The Conceptual and Practical Challenges of Assessing Malingering in Patients With Chronic Pain. J Pain, 20(2), 133-145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2018.07.002

Dang, J., King, K. M., & Inzlicht, M. (2020). Why are self-report and behavioral measures weakly correlated?. Trends in cognitive sciences, 24(4), 267-269.

Hitch, D & Pepin, G. (2021) Doing, being, becoming and belonging at the heart of occupational therapy: An analysis of theoretical ways of knowing, Scandinavian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 28:1, 13-25, DOI: 10.1080/11038128.2020.1726454

Lush, P., Vazire, S., & Holcombe, A. (2020). Demand characteristics confound the rubber hand illusion. Collabra: Psychology, 6(1).

https://methods.sagepub.com/reference/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-communication-research-methods/i4252.xml

Not all pain is the same


When I started working in the field of persistent pain, many of the approaches used were based on the idea that every pain was the same. Oh yes, of course we had neuropathic pain and inflammatory pain, but our treatments tended to approach each person as if they were pretty similar. We later refined that approach and started to look at people in groups. In the service I worked in, we used the Westhaven-Yale Multidimensional Pain Inventory which generates three main psychologically-based profiles – and for a long time this was a very useful way of establishing who needed the three-week residential programme, and who would do well with a briefer outpatient programme.

Well things change over time, and we’ve become more aware of what Clifford Woolf describes as a “mechanism-based” classification approach (Woolf, 2004). In this approach, clinicians try to establish the dominant mechanistic group in which a person’s pain might be classified, then suit the treatment to that mechanism. This means clinicians diagnose inflammatory pain, neuropathic pain, and nociplastic pain – and use what looks like the best combination of medications to suit the mechanisms. For example, for neuropathic pain it’s more likely people will be given gabapentin/pregabalin and a tricyclic antidepressant in combination than an opioid.

There’s a problem, though – in fact, TWO problems I can see.

Methods for identifying pain mechanistic groups

The first problem is that we don’t have wonderful methods for establishing the main mechanistic groups.

In fact, in a recent very large and thorough review of methods used to discriminate between each category, the authors found that “few methods have been validated for discrimination between pain mechanism categories”, and although there was “general convergence” between methods, there was also “some disagreement” (not that this is unfamiliar to anyone who reads research!) Shraim, Masse-Alarie, & Hodges, 2021).

What was interesting, albeit not too unexpected, was the overlap of findings between categories because people present with mixed types of pain; and that many of the studies attempted to only discriminate between two of the groups, rather than more. Having said this, the authors identified five groups of method used to help clinicians and researchers distinguish between pain mechanisms: clinical examination; quantitative sensory testing; imaging; diagnostic and laboratory tests; and questionnaires asking participants to describe their experiences.

Now I know that research studies aim to be a little more rigorous than clinical practice, but that should sound an alarm when we begin looking at what we need to do in clinical practice. “Subjective” pain examination included aggravating and easing factors, pain location and pain characteristics (can anyone tell me when pain is NOT subjective?). It also included psychological factors (although my radar went off at this – more of this later!). Physical examination (is this supposed to be ‘objective’ pain examination?) included general clinical assessment, general neurological testing, nerve provocation testing and neurodynamics, clinical bedside somatosensory function testing, movement and functional testing. Quantitative sensory testing had no greater degree of sensitive, specificity and reliability than physical examination and “subjective” history, and laboratory testing was pretty poor despite superficially looking more “accurate.” A similar state exists for questionnaires – oh lordy!

So these authors found 200 methods that could be used to determine which pain fits into a specific box, but overall the results are pretty underwhelming for clinicians wanting a direction for their approach. It’s not helped that the current “gold standard” used is – wait for it – clinician-based diagnosis.

Where are we left? Well, I think we’re not that far away from where we were in the 1990’s and early 2000s. We really don’t have a clear way to distinguish between the various mechanisms, and many people likely present with pain that includes more than mechanism. However – these authors provide a table summarising the commonly used, and possibly most likely approaches to diagnose pain mechanisms, and this is useful for those of us who want the “best guess” for now.

Problem two

At the beginning of this piece, I said there were two problems with using mechanistic descriptors. You can see the problems with reliability, specificity and so on – and the lack of agreement in the research and likely “mixed” presentations we will see in clinic – from my comments above (do read the whole article, though, it’s well worth it).

The second problem is that these descriptors, even when accurate and reliable, don’t tell us anything about the person experiencing pain. Unless, and until we have effective treatments for each of these mechanisms, we are inevitably running experiments to see what might work for this person in front of us. And this means we find less utility in diagnosis than we would if we drew on a case formulation approach.

What’s the difference? Diagnosis allows us to group “like with like” – on the basis of similar underlying mechanisms. We can then treat those mechanisms, and voila! the person recovers! It works well with fractures, with infectious diseases, and even with diabetes. It doesn’t work as well when we don’t have treatments we can use on the mechanisms. For example, although we can diagnose many neurological disorders, for so many of them we have very poor treatments. This means people live with their disease – and this is where a diagnosis falls down. It does not tell us HOW this person will experience their disease. Diagnosis doesn’t explain illness, disability, functional status, or participation.

And, because all of us are unique, this means that a one-size-fits-all approach to persistent pain (or even an algorithm, subtype, or subgroup) isn’t likely to offer clinicians or the person with pain a useful path towards well-being.

You’ll remember I said my radar went off with the psychological assessments included in the methods used to identify a pain mechanism. My reason is this: pain is a stressor. Even a paper-cut captures my attention (albeit just a little until I use a hand sanitiser!), my heart rate goes up a bit, I’m alerted to the experience and want to get away from it. Now imagine if that pain continued. Maybe variably, maybe constantly, maybe intermittently. And imagine if I couldn’t get a good understanding of what’s going on. And perhaps I was being questioned by my clinicians – and maybe even stigmatised. “What do you mean, you have pain we can’t diagnose, we can’t image, we can’t treat?” I’m guessing by now, perhaps some months after my pain started, I’d be feeling a bit irritated, perhaps a bit low in mood, my sleep might not be great, I might find it hard to do what matters to me because I’m not sure if I’m doing myself some harm.

What we don’t know in many studies of pain “predictors” is whether they are cause or effect. There is undoubtedly an association between various measures of pain-related anxiety, avoidance, low mood, thinking the worst. What we do not know is whether this was present before the pain came on – or whether it came afterwards.

So, to my mind, using psychological factors as part of diagnosis risks labelling people and what are probably normal responses to abnormal experiences. Let’s not do that.

Where am I left after reading this paper? I’m glad someone set about doing this review. I think it offers a good summary of the state of play, and identifies some of the current problems with a mechanistic approach. We need to get consensus on definitions, we need far better methods, we need to stop using the word “subjective pain examination” (because ALL pain is subjective), and we need to leave psychological factors out of diagnosis until we can clearly identify which came first.

Shraim, M. A., Masse-Alarie, H., & Hodges, P. W. (2021, Apr 1). Methods to discriminate between mechanism-based categories of pain experienced in the musculoskeletal system: a systematic review. Pain, 162(4), 1007-1037. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000002113

Woolf CJ. Pain: moving from symptom control toward mechanism-specific pharmacologic management. Ann Intern Med 2004;140:441–51.

What happens to pain over 21 years?


No! I was not born then… I’m much older than that. No, in this longitudinal cohort study, participants recruited from the general public in Sweden were surveyed five times: at inception in 1995, again in 1998, 2003, 2007 and 2016. The article I’m reporting on included all respondents who had completed information on at least 3 of the 5 time points, a total of 1858 people! That’s a decent-sized study.

Longitudinal studies are really hard to do but offer us so much information about what happens over time to a group of people and it’s something we need to do more often. The problems with longitudinal studies are that people drop out, get lost to the researchers, they cost a lot to run, and research changes over time so the research questions may change, the measurement instruments may change, and it’s difficult to predict the variables that might be relevant at the beginning of the study. So, hats off to Aili, Campbell, Michaleff, Strauss, Jordan, Bremander et al (2021) who carried out this study!

Like many of these longitudinal studies, the authors developed an analysis in which groups of people who share similar characteristics in their persistent pain were identified. By following these groups over time, researchers are able to identify who changes, who doesn’t, and to identify some of the predictive factors that might put a person in the “at risk” group for developing increasingly poor outcomes. The “so what” factor for this type of study is that by identifying “at risk” people early on in their trajectory with pain, it may be possible to develop interventions that could help reduce this risk and that has to be both a human and economic gain for a community. In this instance, in order to interpret the findings, it’s important to remember that Sweden and other countries in the world don’t all look alike, have different healthcare systems, different genetic factors, and different social structures that can influence the process. So bear that in mind as I proceed.

The question asked about pain was this: “have you experienced pain lasting more than 3 months during the last 12 months?” Participants were then asked to indicate the location of the pain using a manikin with 18 predefined bodily regions in the musculoskeletal system; head and abdomen were not included (that latter one is a bit of a problem for me, tbh – given abdominal pain is a common experience for many women…). Participants were then identified as either having no chronic pain, or chronic widespread pain or chronic regional pain.

Sleep, health status, socio-economic status, treatment-seeking (for pain), lifestyle factors (alcohol, tobacco use), immigrant status and social support were also analysed.

Now for the statistics! Latent class growth analysis was used to identify common patterns or trajectories of pain over the time of the study. This analysis clusters participants according to their pain status over time, with each cluster representing a certain pattern of pain over time – participants were placed in a group where they had the highest probability of belonging based on their individual pattern of pain over time.

Results

At the beginning of the study, nearly 13% of participants reported chronic widespread pain, with just over a quarter (25.3%) reporting chronic regional pain. Using the analysis and various confirmatory statistical processes, the authors identified a 4-cluster model, and a 5-cluster model. Both models included a group that had NO ongoing pain at all, as well as a group with ongoing widespread pain. The preferred model was the 4-cluster model, as this had four different but clinically meaningful patterns – persistent no pain; persistent chronic widespread pain; those moving from chronic regional pain to chronic widespread pain, and a change trajectory: eg no chronic pain to chronic regional pain or chronic widespread pain. The cluster identified as including those who typically migrated from NCP to CRP or CWP was the smallest (5% of the sample), and the least reliably detected.

The trajectories are really interesting: (1) 47% of people never reported persistent pain at all over the 21 years. 5% pf people reporting no pain initially, but then moved to chronic regional pain or chronic widespread pain over time. (2) 22% of people reported chronic pain initially, or moved from chronic pain to no pain over time – the authors argue that the cluster of people may have chronic regional pain initially and migrate between chronic regional pain and no pain over time. (3) 10% of the group moved from chronic regional pain to chronic widespread pain and this grew more likely over time. (4) The final group were a small group (6%) of people who continued to report chronic widespread pain over the whole 21 years

The predictors for those in group (3) were being female, seeking care for pain over the preceding 12 months, lack of social support, poor physical function, poor vitality, and poor mental health. Being a manual worker nearly made the cut, and in an age-adjusted analysis, did for the group moving to widespread pain. Age (middle-age!), poor sleep, smoking and being an immigrant also tended towards having a poorer prognosis.

What on earth does this mean?

Well, one exciting thing is that a large group of people never experience persistent pain. This might imply that these people are generally more healthy, and it can also help explain why some people living with pain feel so alienated from the rest of their community. If most people around you don’t develop pain, then they most likely don’t understand what it might be like to live with pain 24/7.

When we look at the factors that predicted moving from no pain to chronic pain, there were several factors that can be modified to reduce the risk: sleep problems, poor physical and mental health, poor vitality, seeking treatment, and limited social support. Perhaps by addressing these factors, some people might find their move towards greater pain could be reversed, or at least halted. My question is, however, whether treatment seeking might reflect the fact the person wasn’t feel great either physically or mentally, and for some people, being unwell might mean withdrawing from social interaction, so it’s not entirely simple to interpret.

The authors point out that “The highest risk of belonging to the group developing CRP or CWP is seen in age groups below 50 years. Previously published figures from baseline data in this study show a prevalence of over 20% of chronic pain already among 20 to 29 year olds. The overall image is that long-term patterns of pain are already becoming established by the time adulthood is reached, and rising age in adulthood increases the likelihood of stable patterns over time.” [italics mine] They also point out that women who develop pain have a greater risk for developing long-term and increasingly widespread pain. Other important factors for this group were those who were older, had poor sleep, worked in a manual job, drank less alcohol, were immigrants, had less education, generally poor health, more care seeking and low social support.

To me, this study shows the impact of living on the fringes of our society – the women (in particular) who work manual jobs like cleaning, who left school early, perhaps moved to a new country and have few friends, and were probably quite stressed – leading to poor sleep, and poorer health, with consequent treatment seeking. What are we doing to help these women? Here in New Zealand, we can probably add Māori, Pasifika, refugees, and people who don’t speak English terribly well. How well are our current pain management services working for these people?

Aili, K., Campbell, P., Michaleff, Z. A., Strauss, V. Y., Jordan, K. P., Bremander, A., Croft, P., & Bergman, S. (2021, May 1). Long-term trajectories of chronic musculoskeletal pain: a 21-year prospective cohort latent class analysis. Pain, 162(5), 1511-1520. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000002137

Family and friends matter


I’m going back to my series on behavioural approaches to pain management (it’s a slow process!). For the first two go here and here. Now I want to talk about the impact of family and friends on people living with pain.

The people we live with are so influential on what we do and believe about pain. It’s our parents who first taught us the relationship between the word “pain” and the experience we know as pain. It’s our parents and family who responded when we cried, who kissed it better (or not), who told us to “harden up” (or not), who took us to the doctor (or not), who showed us, through their own behaviour, how to “do pain.”

There’s a good deal of research investigating the impact of friends and family on pain behaviour (remember the distinction I make between pain-the-experience and pain behaviour or what we do when we’re sore? click). For instance, a systematic review by Snippen, de Vries, van der Burg-Vermeulen, Hagedoorn and Brouwer (2019) looked at people with chronic diseases, and the attitudes and beliefs of significant others. They found that “positive and encouraging attitudes regarding work participation, encouragement and motivating behaviour and open communication with patients” were facilitators for work participation while “positive attitudes towards sickness absence and advise, encouragement or pressure to refrain from work” were barriers to returning to work.

In another study, Burns, Post, Smith, Porter and colleagues (2019) observed spouse dyads behaviour after arguing then the person with pain undergoing a pain induction task. Spouses that believed that the patient’s pain was a mystery were significantly more likely to be perceived by the patient as giving critical/invalidating responses toward the patient during the discussion; while spouse perceptions that the patient’s pain was a mystery were related to internal and negative attributions spouses made while observing patients display pain behaviors during the structured pain behavior task (p. 1176).

In another study, this one a daily diary study with people living with osteoarthritis in their knee, found that on days when the person with pain reported more thinking the worst, their spouses were more unhappy during the day. And on the days when the partner was more irritated with the person living with pain, that person reported more thinking the worst the next morning. The link? The people with pain who were thinking the worst were also more grumpy through the day, and this was rubbing off on their partner. (Martier, Zhaoyang, Marini, Nah & Darnell, 2019).

Makes sense, doesn’t it? That when we see our loved one demonstrate that they’re sore, and they’re grumpy – and if we’re not sure they’re for real – we might be less supportive as partners than if we think their pain is for real. And over time the pattern of being sympathetic might wear thin – in fact, Chris Main (psychologist) describes a pattern of initial solicitous behaviour (the “there, there dear, I’ll fetch you a cup of tea”), then resentment (“surely you’ve recovered now?”), then anger and punitive behaviour (ignoring the person, getting irritated with them), but then feeling guilty about this (“OMG I know, it’s not your fault and I’ve been so mean”), returning to being solicitous – until the next time the partner feels fed up.

What does this mean for a behavioural approach?

Well, it’s not surprising that if one of the partners thinks the other “should be well now”, they’re likely to be unsympathetic as we begin changing the person’s behaviour. Often we’re attempting to help someone be consistent with their daily activities, and this can often begin by reducing how much should be attempted so the person can “do no more on a good day, and do no less on a bad day.”

And if the partner is really worried about the person with pain, and afraid that doing more is going to increase pain and prolong disability, it’s also not surprising that the partner is likely to be worried about us asking the person to do things differently (especially exercise!).

And don’t forget that during this time, both partners are probably trying to keep some semblance of normal going. They still have the usual household tasks to get done, to pay the bills, to get the kids to and from school, to keep in touch with extended family and friends and so on.

It’s stressful. And we add to the burden when we ask the person to do something different, whether this be doing exercises, using a mindfulness or relaxation technique, perhaps go to various appointments all around town…and if we don’t include the impact of what we expect on the partner, we’re possibly not going to have “the team” on board with the rehabilitation programme.

The very best option is to ask the person’s partner to come in to at least one of our treatment sessions, so we can spend some time talking about what we’re asking the person with pain to do, and getting an indication from the partner about their willingness to follow the programme. The next best option is to write the programme down, and include “things family can do to help” – listing the kinds of things family and friends can do (and what they should avoid doing).

You see, people we see for help never live in a vacuum. They always have a context of friends, family, home, responsibilities, expectations from them, expectations for the work we do. Forgetting about this and expecting a good result fails to recognise the embedded nature of life. Contextual factors are important, no person is an island.

Burns, J. W., Post, K. M., Smith, D. A., Porter, L. S., Buvanendran, A., Fras, A. M., & Keefe, F. J. (2019). Spouse and patient beliefs and perceptions about chronic pain: effects on couple interactions and patient pain behavior. The Journal of Pain, 20(10), 1176-1186.

Martire, L. M., Zhaoyang, R., Marini, C. M., Nah, S., & Darnall, B. D. (2019). Daily and bidirectional linkages between pain catastrophizing and spouse responses. Pain, 160(12), 2841.

Snippen, N. C., de Vries, H. J., van der Burg-Vermeulen, S. J., Hagedoorn, M., & Brouwer, S. (2019). Influence of significant others on work participation of individuals with chronic diseases: a systematic review. BMJ Open, 9(1), e021742. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-021742

Self-care


No, not the Instagram “self-care” of floofy slippers and a glass of wine, or an excuse to indulge in chocolate. No, I’m talking about the gritty self-care that all of us humans need to do, only some of us need to it more regularly or we’ll experience Consequences.

Self-care for people living with pain is no luxury, and it does (occasionally) mean walking away from something enjoyable, setting boundaries on demands for time and energy, AND it means many other things too.

I’ll talk about my own self-care needs because I can’t talk authentically about anyone else. Most of you will know I live with fibromyalgia, and that I’m pretty happy with my lifestyle and dealing with pain. Mostly it’s just a nuisance that I live alongside, and make room for. Sometimes it’s a PITA, and over the last year it’s been more of that and less of the “just a nuisance”.

My fibromyalgia involves widespread body pain (currently neck/shoulder but randomly goes to other places – maybe for a holiday? Who would know!). I also experience fatigue. In fact, the pain is nothing to bother me because I know it’s not a sign I’ve harmed myself – it’s the fatigue that is a killer. Probably the most difficult thing to deal with.

So when I went to a conference, and had a few late nights it didn’t surprise me to feel exhausted. I’m lucky in that I can take a couple of days off for some downtime, and I slept and now I’m pretty much back to normal. Except that it’s a short week with Easter coming up, and I have a whole day out because of a procedure – and I’m teaching Thursday night while also having some other deadlines coming up.

Lurching from frantically catching up to crashing is called “boom and bust” in our persistent pain language. According to conventional pain management wisdom (based on books like Manage Your Pain by Prof Michael Nicholas) pacing is The Way to Go. And there’s some merit in the idea of being consistent in what to expect from yourself, building up from a baseline to what works for you in your life context, to reduce the number of times you have to apologise for not being able to do something because you’ve either flared or you’re fatigued.

The problem with pacing is that we still have little agreement on what we mean by the word (is it gradually increasing activity levels? is it stopping before we flare up? is it planning each moment of the day, breaking each task into 10 – 20 minutes with a break in between? is it about using time instead of pain/fatigue as the guide for what you do?). There’s even less evidence to support pacing as a strategy – few randomised trials of pacing and studies have shown associations between pacing and avoidance. Yet it remains one of the more popular and widely-endorsed strategies for living well with persistent pain.

Coming back to self-care, one of the issues for me is to understand how I get into the situation where my fatigue and pain begins to interfere with my plans. Is it my planning that’s awry? Should I say no more often? Should I ask for help more often? Am I bad for pushing myself? Am I over-reaching myself, spreading myself too thin?

And even as I ask these questions of myself, I feel my mind judging me. After all, I should know better! I’ve been living with pain most of my life. I teach people about pain. I’ve worked clinically. Seriously I ought not to do this to myself. I should be perfect!!

Well, as anyone who knows me is perfectly aware: I am not perfect. And I mess up. I did last week when I completely forgot an appointment with someone because my mind was fried.

Here’s the thing though. This amount of self-analysis, of questioning, of planning, of organising around something that I never asked for, is what anyone with persistent pain goes through. And the often-glib “go exercise” or “just pace” or “let’s ignore pain and pretend it’s not a thing” often fails to touch the constant demands that living with a chronic/ongoing health problem poses. The negative and critical mind is prone to sniping at the “who” I am, while onlookers, clinicians in particular, might not even be aware of just how brutal and energy-sapping this process is. Every. Single. Day.

I do not have a glib answer to how best to live well with pain, and as you can tell I’m still learning even 35 years down the track! I do know I’m determined, and that drawing on values and being flexible about how I do what matters in my life has meant I’ve stayed working (even in a demanding job), kept on playing (creative pursuits are like oil on dry skin), learned to keep my eyes on the prize and not sweat the small stuff…

This post is a plea to health professionals working with people who are in the early stages of living with persisting pain: don’t add things to a person’s life without thinking about the constant juggle the person will need to do often for the rest of their life. Don’t make up another list of exercises, or make suggestions about another technique to add in to their already busy daily life without asking yourself “Could I do this every day? In the presence of ongoing pain?” Ask yourself, too, whether you’re implying that this person is “doing it wrong.” Think hard about all the things each person needs and wants to do in their life – if you’re going to suggest adding yet another thing into their day, consider what this person might need to abandon to fit it in, think about when and where and how this person can do what you’re suggesting.

When we’re clinicians, we can be prone to suggesting that people with pain “aren’t motivated.” I reject this – motivation isn’t a trait, or a quantity we’re given or not given. Motivation is about importance, and confidence. And for so many people with pain, confidence is very very low. Saying no to things requires confidence. And sometimes saying no is the hardest thing.

Self-care. It’s a life-long commitment to being vigilant about the choices I make every day, because the consequences of not caring for myself can be tough to swallow. And yet it’s also OK to mess up and to be with that flare or fatigue, and remember what matters in life.

Modifying pain behaviour (2)


Two concepts that receive limited attention in the allied health literature are nomothetic and idiographic approaches. I’m discussing these concepts here because when we’re considering pain behaviour, I think we can focus much more on “generic” (nomothetic) concepts than we do idiographic ones – and yet we say we’re about the unique person in front of us.

Firstly, this site offers a good summary of the difference between nomothetic and idiographic – click

Essentially, nomothetic approaches focus on underlying generalities, perhaps traits, and are a solid part of the science of measurement in psychology. Given that much of our allied health measurement practice is based on psychological theories (such as using aggregated or grouped data to search for differences in means between two groups), it’s not surprising that we’ve tended to reach for a self-report measure when we want to understand what a person thinks and does when they’re sore. Think of the Oxford Knee Score, or the Oswestry Disability Index, for examples!

Here’s an item from the Oswestry Disability Index (Fairbank, Couper, Davies et al, 1980)

Section 5 – Sitting
I can sit in any chair as long as I like.
I can sit in my favorite chair as long as I like.
Pain prevents me from sitting for more than 1 hour.
Pain prevents me from sitting for more than ½ hour.
Pain prevents me from sitting for more than 10
minutes.
Pain prevents me from sitting at all.

When a person reads these items, they’re asked to indicate the answer that best fits their experience, but left unanswered are these points: what time of day? what kind of chair? what is the person doing in the chair? who is around that person? why is the person sitting for a long time? what is it about the pain that stops the person from sitting? what do they think is going on?

While the measure itself is based on rigorous methodology, has excellent psychometric properties and so on – it doesn’t investigate important dimensions that we need as clinicians to help this person perhaps alter their sitting tolerance.

Alternative measurement approaches are available: item response theory is one (click) and multi-level modelling is another (click) – but the former still considers latent traits (ie can we identify a general underlying response that underlies all the variability we see in the data), and multi-level modelling also assumes that the respondents still belong to a general population who will demonstrate similarities around the variable in question.

The problem is that people don’t always follow the rules. Here’s an example:

A woman I saw once had low back pain, and was very afraid to bend forward. She was particularly worried about bending down in the shower to wash her lower legs, and when she saw me she avoided putting her handbag on the floor because this would mean she’d need to bend down to pick it up.

To get around this concern, she’d learned to sit on the floor of her shower to wash her lower legs, used pull-on shoes with elastic laces, or court shoes for work, and she’d put socks and pantihose on while sitting on the floor.

At the same time, she was comfortable sitting for around an hour, was able to stand as a customer service person for an eight hour day, and was happy driving – but not happy about reaching into the back of her car (it was a two-door) because it meant she was bending.

For this woman, her score on the Oswestry was below 20% or considered to be “minimal disability” – and yet she was almost turning herself inside out to be able to do what mattered to her.

An idiographic approach to her situations looks a little more deeply at the function of behaviour in context. If we take a look at the amount of spine flexion within her activities of daily living, we can see that sitting on the floor to wash her legs, and to pull shoes and socks on involves just as much movement as if she was bending down. What was different? Well, she was really afraid she’d slip in the shower and land in an undignified heap on the floor, needing to be rescued – while being naked! She said she’d been told that she shouldn’t bend because she had a disc prolapse and she’d seen one of those spine models with the bright red disc bulge and thought this was going to be much worse if she bent over. She was very concerned about appearances as she worked in a customer service role, so developing a way to still get dressed while avoiding bending forward was really important to her – but it took her much longer to do, much more effort to do it, and she remained quite certain that this red jelly would ooze from her disc if she bent forward.

In a behavioural approach to pain management, it’s important to understand the antecedents and consequences of a behaviour, so we can understand what elicits the behaviour, and what consequences occur to maintain it. In this woman’s case, any context where she might need to lean forward – such as making her bed, picking clothes up from the floor, putting shoes and socks on from standing, picking her handbag up, reaching into the back of her car to fetch something – elicited a thought (image) for her of her disc oozing out. Combined with her interpretation of the advice not to bend when she first sought help, her response was one of fear – and one thing we learn very early on as humans is that we should avoid things that generate fear.

The consequences of her avoiding forward flexion were many: her fears weren’t allayed except in the moment, and she remained highly concerned about the disc bulge; she felt relieved in the moment as she avoided doing the movements she thought would harm her. This is negative reinforcement – fear (negative experience) is reduced (withdrawn) because she avoided the movement (relief – I’ve avoided a disaster!). She also avoided doing many things she’d enjoyed – like playing tennis (bending down to pick up a ball? No way!), picking her clothes up from the floor (she had a home helper do this, and do her washing), she’d changed the shoes she wore to avoid having to bend down to tie laces, and she sat on the floor of her shower to avoid having to bend down to wash her legs.

When we started to work on helping her move on with life, it was really important to understand the unique combination of context and function of her strategies for avoiding bending. Just telling her that her discs wouldn’t bulge out wouldn’t alter those powerful images in her mind! We can’t unlearn an association once we’ve learned it. And she’d been practicing this association between an image of disc bulge oozing and bending – and all the activities where we bend, and all the associations she’d made between jelly wobbling (because the disc is basically jelly, right?), and all the other things she knew about jelly – it’s not strong, it can smear over things, it wobbles, it can melt…. My approach was to help her experience doing without the dire consequences, starting from simple and moving to more challenging over time. More on this next week!

As clinicians, our words matter, as do the images and models we have in our clinics. We also must be mindful that the people we try to help will bring their history and the unique associations they’ve made between things they’ve been told, metaphors they’ve heard and the values that matter to them. Respecting all those vitally important and idiosyncratic aspects of being human is integral to a behavioural approach to pain rehabilitation. Let’s not put people into algorithms or groups or boxes, because if we take the time to learn about their uniqueness we can create more powerful – and fun! approaches to helping them live their lives again.

Fairbank J, Couper J, Davies J, et al. The Oswestry low back pain questionnaire.
Physiotherapy 1980;66:271–3.

Pain model – helping to target change


In my recent post on behavioural approaches to pain management, I had a number of commentators ask why do it, why not focus on pain intensity, and aren’t I invalidating a person’s experience if I target a person’s response to their experience. Today’s post will explore some of these points.

I suppose my first point needs to distinguish between pain as an experience, and pain behaviour – or what we do when we experience pain. I like to use a pretty old “model” or diagram to help untangle these concepts. It’s drawn from Loeser’s “Onion ring” model, and he wrote about this way back in the early 1980’s. This is my interpretation of that way of thinking about the person experiencing pain. It’s not intended to represent Truth – but to help us to get our heads around an individual’s truth, or their experience. It’s one way to consider the factors we’ve learned are associated with human pain. It should be evaluated in terms of its utility and practical usefulness for a person experiencing pain, and for clinicians hoping to help them.

The “BIO”

Firstly, we have all the neurobiological processes involved in transmitting nociceptive information throughout the body. Much of this information never reaches conscious awareness – activity in nociceptors occurs all the time, and we have rapid reflexive responses to this such as blinking, shifting in a chair, swaying while standing and so on. A whole lot of neurobiological activity occurs as this information reaches conscious awareness – much of this activity occurs above the brainstem. In fact, if we look carefully at neurobiological activity, much of the reason we never notice reflex responses to nociception is because we have a pretty effective inhibitory system that’s operating constantly to limit how much nociceptive activity hits consciousness. That’s all part of cortical and brainstem (yeah – BRAIN) processes. If anyone learns neurobiology of pain and doesn’t include attention, motivation, emotion, expectations then they’re missing an enormous chunk of what nociception and pain are about.

Added to this neurobiological information are another whole bunch of physiological and hormonal responses – and these are incredibly complex and often omitted from our discussions. For example, men and women differ in their hormone production, and this means more women experience persistent pain, women have lower pain tolerance, and respond to nociceptive information more quickly and at lower thresholds than men.

Suffice to say, there are a whole bunch of biological processes that are integral to our experience of pain and to nociceptive transmission, transduction and perception. So if anyone should suggest that a “biopsychosocial” model of pain does not include BIO – go wash your mouth out please.

Pain-the-experience

The next aspect of pain that Loeser included was “pain-the-experience” – the subjective, personal, unshareable “what it is like to experience pain” part. This encompasses the qualia – the sensory qualities of pain, and includes intensity and location. Pain is always experienced as having a negative or aversive quality, so we know that the urge to avoid or take action to reduce, and indeed our tendency to attend to this experience is part of a human experience of pain. Note that Loeser (and I) don’t include appraisal at this point! In other words, this is the “ouch” that a baby feels when we perform a Guthrie heel prick test. It’s that moment when scalding coffee hits your lap, before you’ve realised you’ve spilled your coffee.

But just to complicate things here – unless we’re newborns, we’re always aware of context and pretty much once we learn language, we’re interpreting when/where/how/why events are happening. This means that factors such as expectations, past learning, predictions we make about “what next” always inform “pain-the-experience”. Even before we’re consciously aware of these influences! So technically, as soon as we recognise “ouch” we’re already invoking a whole bunch of higher cortical processes into our experience. This matters because pain is a conscious experience, and requires perception before it can be experienced.

Judgement or appraisal

The next “ring” of Loeser’s model was called “suffering” – I’ve translated this into a cognitive process of “appraisal” because while pain is inherently tainted with negative emotional valence and a motivational urge to avoid, it’s also possible to view our experience of pain in different ways. Some commonplace examples are the jab from a vaccination – many of us will welcome that nociceptive input, and judge the pain to be negligible. Others who may be less comfortable with a vaccination might view it more negatively and be more aware of that pain. People who run or train in a gym might appraise the pain from working hard “feel the burn” as a sign that they’ve done enough to make performance gains. And some of us who live with persistent pain such as fibromyalgia might notice pain and consider it to be “just a nuisance”.

Suffering is an interesting concept, and I prefer to take Erik Cassel’s definition of it: suffering refers to the loss of a sense of self. A paper cut typically doesn’t lead to a loss of sense of self, while low back pain that remains for many months might be far more likely to erode that sense of “who I am and what I can do”.

Judgements and appraisals are influenced by a whole lot of factors – socio-cultural norms (I’m in a rugby-mad country, if a rugby player experiences pain on the field, he or she may well grit teeth and keep going, believing that it’s not OK to “give in” to pain – the appraisal might be “this isn’t so bad, I can still keep going”. Socio-cultural norms are often implicit – we absorb them effortlessly within our own cultural context, and we’re quite capable of holding different implicit norms depending on our current proximity to our social group. Consider the rugby player who will brush off an on-the-field injury but when getting a splinter might feel a little sick. The meanings we attribute to our pain influence how willing we are to go with them – tattoos and body piercings and body suspensions are really good examples of times when we’re OK to experience pain in the pursuit of something else, similarly post-surgical pain after joint arthroplasty.

When appraisals are unhelpful is when we get tripped up. When a person holds an inaccurate understanding of what’s happening – thinking, perhaps, that this back pain is a sign of cancer metastasising, or the end of a career as a sportsman, or an indication of some dire outcome, then a couple of things happen. Firstly, negative emotions are likely to rise, along with sympathetic arousal (the two systems are linked in the experience of pain), and then what we do about pain also begin to turn to short-term over long-term outcomes.

Pain behaviours

Pain behaviours are what we do when we experience pain, and they’re shaped both by evolution and by socio-cultural norms, as well as what we think is going on. I wrote about pain behaviour recently – click

Pain behaviours are the only part of “what it is like to experience pain” that we can observe.

Let me say that again – what we do about pain is the only part of the pain experience that a person who is NOT The Person In Pain that we can share.

Pain behaviour includes everything a person does and says in relation to their pain, both reflexive and automatic actions that we’re not aware of, as well as those we are aware of. Some of the behaviours we do are reflex responses (blinking and tearing up), some of them are not. Some of them are well-learned – we’ve been doing them since we were tiny kids. Others are things we’ve learned to do, perhaps on the advice of someone else, or because we’ve observed someone else, or because we think it might help or it’s worked once before.

The thing is – pain behaviours are malleable. They can and do change. Again, read my earlier post on how pain behaviours can be changed, and know that just because a behaviour has changed, the person’s experience of pain may not. In other words, while I move pretty normally, and to many onlookers I don’t appear to have pain – I still do.

Social context

I’ve already alluded to the influence of contextual factors. Things we’re aware of – prevailing attitudes in our immediate social group, our community, our spouse, our treatment providers. Things we’re often less aware – of implicit attitudes about gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, supposed pain mechanisms, visibility of tissue damage and so on. And we are ALL influenced by these implicit socially constructed attitudes and beliefs, people with pain and their clinicians and their families and their communities….

I often use this way of exploring factors involved in why a person is presenting in this way at this time, and what might be done to reduce distress and disability. I might package the conversation in various ways – perhaps more complex if I expand on some aspects, perhaps less so if the person doesn’t want or need to explore something (often this is the neurobiological part). While it’s imperfect remember that the purpose of a model like this is contextual. I am not hoping to represent Truth as a universal law about “how pain works”. I AM hoping to explore useful elements for a particular purpose. One purpose might be to demonstrate that emotions and appraisals influence pain behaviour. Another might be to introduce medical students to the complex factors that might be involved in their interpretation of a patient’s distress. And another to help someone understand why he avoids a movement in one context but not in another. And even another might be to help someone know why she has such a panicky feeling when she’s in the middle of a flare-up.

As a pragmatist, and basing my practice on approaches that might help this person achieve a specific something in this moment, I use models like these to build therapeutic alliance, to enable the person to be willing to play with new ways of being, and to help them recognise that the target for change might not be what they initially think is relevant.

Loeser, JD. (1980). Perspectives on pain. In P. Turner (Ed.), Clinical Pharmay & Therapeutics (pp. 313-316). London: Macmillan.

Loeser, JD. (1982). Concepts of pain. In M. Stanton-Hicks & R. Boas (Eds.), Chronic low back pain (pp. 145-148). New York: Raven Press.