Clinical reasoning

Making the first contact


How do we begin working with someone who is asking for help with their persistent pain? In this post I’ll describe some of the considerations I have when I begin, because as Benedetti points out, the “meet the therapist moment” is one of the most potent times in the therapeutic ritual (Benedetti, 2011). It’s the time when the person’s expectations and the clinician’s empathy and competence meet, and the “meaning response” blooms.

My two clinical questions are:

  1. Why is this person presenting in this way at this time, and what’s maintaining their predicament?
  2. And what is this person’s main concern?

But before I ask these questions, I want to take a moment to think about the person and what might be going on in his or her mind.

Benedetti points out that expectancies are an important part of a response to treatment – whether that treatment has any active action, or not. Expectancies are about what a person brings to a therapeutic encounter: there are two, one is stimulus expectancies (anticipations of external events – eg that the next painful experience will be less), and the other is response expectancies (predictions of your own nonvolitional response – eg that after doing this thing, I expect to experience less pain) (Kirsch, 1985).

People who come to see a clinician, especially a clinician from a little-known profession (occupational therapy!) will hold expectancies about what that person will do, but these will likely be weaker than the expectancies a person might hold about seeing a well-known profession. The strength of an expectancy is different from the direction of an expectancy – for example, a negative experience with a physiotherapist might lead to a strongly negative expectancy about future treatments, while not having had an experience with an occupational therapist might lead to a weakly positive expectancy about what’s about to happen.

Along with expectancies, the person will likely be anxious about what’s to come. The possibility of something that might help (or not), meeting a new clinician, and living with pain are all stressors – and anxiety erodes a person’s ability to absorb lots of information, while biasing them towards remembering threatening words (Reidy & Richards, 1997).

So there’s a lot going on in the person’s mind when they attend that first session.

There’s also often a large power imbalance (Joseph-Williams, Edwards & Elwyn, 2014). This emerges from the fact that often clinicians hold a lot more information about the person we’re seeing than they do about us. Especially after we’ve asked a bunch of questions, often quite intimate in nature. For a person seeking help, this imbalance can make it hard to ask questions, to direct the conversation, to hold a sense of independence throughout the encounter.

So having set the scene for you, I’m sure you can agree that how we go about collecting information from a person is incredibly important – especially so that relationship can begin to build.

Introductions

In the introduction, I seek to give the person some information about who I am – not just as a clinician, and the kind of treatments I use, but also about who I am. I’ve drawn inspiration from tikanga Māori here, where the cultural tradition entails letting the person know where I come from and who I’m connected to. I like to let people know my childhood roots are in Turanganui a kiwa, or Gisborne. That the mountain my heart connects with is Mount Hikurangi – the first mountain in NZ to see the sun. The river I connect with is the Taruheru, flowing into the sea in Gisborne. I also let people know my whanau connections – the Lennox’s, and the Thompson’s, are my whanau (extended family), and I’m a 5th generation New Zealander. I now live in Otautahi/Christchurch. This introduction only takes a few minutes, and your culture might not value this form of introduction. For me in Aotearoa/New Zealand, it’s one way I can show respect and follow a tradition that means the person I work with knows something more about me than just my name.

I also include my profession – what I do. I’m an occupational therapist, my job is to help people do what matters in their life contexts.

I like to then let the person know that they’re brave and courageous for seeking help – it’s not easy to say you can’t do this on your own. It takes courage to tell someone that.

Questions

Then I open with a broad question about what has led this person to come to see me. I might add in something about “tell me about your pain and what you’ve done so far for it.” I’ll often ask what their theory is about their pain, what they think is going on.

Then I ask “What is your main concern today?”

Throughout this process I’m reflecting what I’ve heard, to ensure I’ve understood what the person has experienced. I’m NOT giving reinterpretations, I’m NOT giving out new information, I’m just listening.

I often spend time asking about four areas of life: relationships, fun, work, and health. Or I might ask the person to take me through a typical day, from the time they wake up.

I like to find out not just what the person has done to help themselves, but also what they’ve learned from these experiences. The messages they’ve received over time, and the things they’ve tried but perhaps didn’t like or that didn’t help.

Questionnaires

I was a big fan of questionnaires filled out ahead of time, and I am still a fan but don’t use them as much. This is mainly because so many people have filled out endless questionnaires and nobody has sat down with them to talk about what they mean! So I’m a little more selective and focus much more on listening first then choosing something that will offer me and the person some insight into what might be going on. For example, I might choose the PASS20 (McCracken & Dhingra, 2002) because it helps me figure out where to begin with reducing pain-related anxiety. It’s a good measure to use each week to track changes over time, and I’m beginning to delve into repeated measures of progress rather than a pre-post-follow-up approach that’s typical.

Observation

Covid has meant it’s not as easy to carry out observational assessments, but I’m always watching how the person sits, moves, walks, and body language. What I’m not doing is interpreting these observations without talking to the person about them! Too many clinicians make judgements about the person based on maybe one or two observations, out of context of the person’s life and environment, and without checking in with the person to work out what might be contributing to what they see. Let’s not do that – the person might be completely oblivious that they’re guarding their sore hand, or they keep shifting in the chair, or that a habitual movement like taking a jacket off might be easier to do than being asked to perform some weird movement at the command of the clinician!

Pulling it all together

Just as we wouldn’t expect to be marched in for surgery straight after our first consultation with an orthopaedic surgeon, I don’t believe it’s OK to offer something to a person on their first visit just because we feel internal pressure to do so. Having said this, I will often suggest to the person that they spend a bit of time doing some brief “noticing without judging” exercises. We’ll give it a go at this first appointment, so they’re not being expected to go do it without knowing how. The reason I start with brief noticing experiments is that it’s something we could all do more often, it gives the person a new skill (usually) to develop, and it’s often an introduction to being fully present without judging. Being fully present without judging is hard to do when you’re sore because the mind likes to anticipate how bad it’s going to be (“you’ll need to take it very quietly or you’ll pay for it”) or remember previous pains (“last time you just sat around your pain went nuts, you don’t want to risk that now do you?”).

Notes/Documentation

I write conversational notes directly to the person, going through what we’ve talked about and pulling together all the information I’ve gathered in this first meeting. I find it helps me to make sense of what’s going on, it allows me some time to reflect on what I’ve observed and heard, and I can assemble it in a case formulation that the person and I can explore if/when we meet again.

Assessment is never over. Every time I meet with a person I’ll be learning more about what’s going on. I don’t feel pressured to “find it all out” at that first session just because there are goals that must be developed. In fact, one goal I leave in for everyone is “develop goals” (well, I don’t use goal language – it’s more about directions and actions that take you there). Because seriously, how can anyone meet someone and immediately develop goals – that’s disrespectful to the person who may not have had time to think about what matters the most, and it’s disrespectful to the complexity of goal setting as a process anyway.

Theme and variations

I’ve written one approach I use for learning about the person I’m trying to help. There are others – a time line, drawing a life map, mind-mapping, walking and talking, making a coffee – all of these and more can be used to explore the same information.

Let’s not call it “the subjective” – let’s call it what it is, our first “getting to know you” meeting.

Kirsch, I. (1985). Response expectancy as a determinant of experience and behavior. American Psychologist, 40(11), 1189–1202.

Joseph-Williams, N., Edwards, A., & Elwyn, G. (2014). Power imbalance prevents shared decision making. Bmj, 348.

McCracken, L. M., & Dhingra, L. (2002). A short version of the Pain Anxiety Symptoms Scale (PASS-20): preliminary development and validity. Pain Research & Management, 7(1), 45-50.

Reidy, J., & Richards, A. (1997). Anxiety and memory: A recall bias for threatening words in high anxiety. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(6), 531-542.

One plus one may not always equal two


If it hurts – take notice, and avoid it. Learn from it. If there are other people around, make sure your behaviour is noticeable so they take care of you and don’t do what you just did. If they look after you, you’ll probably do the same thing again when you hurt, if they don’t you probably won’t.

This is one description of pain behaviour and how it works. It’s the only part of our pain experience that we can share directly with one another (actions and words). The “doing” part is also the part that is most affected by pain – even distress is signalled to others – so it’s unsurprising that a lot of attention has been paid to how therapists can change behaviours that are unhelpful.

Many of us start with offering an explanation. Language is something that sets humans apart from other creatures because we learn concepts, and associate one concept with another through it (see Beeckman, Hughes, Kissi, Simons & Goubert (2019) for excellent insights into relational frame theory and pain). I’m sure there are many clinicians who’ve tried to give information (to “educate”) to a person and found it works well. And then there are those who just don’t get it. There are three main points that people who respond well to “education” seem to find useful: (1) pain doesn’t mean my body is damaged (the old “hurt does not equal harm” message that originated with Fordyce. Butler (2017) offers us a selection of Fordyce’s wisdom – and wit); (2) thoughts, emotions and experiences affect my pain (again, something the cognitive behavioural therapists have been sharing with people since the beginning of multidisciplinary pain management programmes); and (3) I can retrain my over-protective nervous system (yes, another thing we’ve been doing in pain management for many years… not that we are unlearning pain, we’re helping the nervous system settle down and becoming less distressed by the experience).

We quite like talking to people – maybe because it appeals to our often dictatorial mind (read A Liberated Mind for a new take on this!). And so for people experiencing pain, we talk. But talk on its own isn’t super-effective. After all, for every one time we hear “pain doesn’t mean my body is damaged” we can Google and find literally hundreds of messages telling us our spine is fragile, our joints are damaged and pain is a sign there is harm.

So what is more potent than words? It’s learning by experience. Doing.

A brand new analysis of “sufficient conditions” for psychological therapy was published in Pain (Batho, Kneale, Sutcliffe & Williams, 2021).

Now I do have some reservations about calling this “psychological” because that word is loaded with meanings, not all of them helpful. Truth to tell, we humans use psychological approaches effortlessly in daily life – and it’s not “in the head/mind/emotions” which is almost inevitably what people first think of when they hear it…

In this analysis (which is complex – go read the paper!), the authors investigated 38 studies, did some horrendous statistical analysis and compared the ten most effective treatments with the ten least effective treatments. What they found was quite surprising, and I’m still pondering what it means.

They established that “interventions using graded exposure, graded exercise or behavioural rehearsal (exposure/activity), and interventions aiming to modify reinforcement contingencies (social/ operant) reduced disability levels when either approach was applied but not both.” [italics mine] They also found “exposure/activity can improve distress levels when combined with cognitive restructuring, as long as social/operant methods are not included in treatment.” [italics mine]

It pleased me to find that graded exposure or reactivation, when applied in the absence of social and operant contingencies, reduced disability and distress. And that social/operant approaches reduced disability on its own. The reason I’m happy is that graded exposure and reactivation with a dab of “let’s notice your thoughts and check out whether they’re helping you” are very common approaches used across occupational therapy, physiotherapy, chiropractic, osteopathy, coaching and a whole bunch of therapists who work with people in pain. Graded reactivation with information has been the mainstay of pain management since at least the 1980’s. We know it’s helpful. Graded exposure has gained popularity since the mid-1990’s and we know that it’s helpful too. And we use social reinforcement just because we’re humans.

In the analysis, ACT was used in only one study. ACT doesn’t do cognitive restructuring and instead, uses six interwoven processes that together support psychological flexibility. I use ACT as my primary approach, both for myself in daily living, and with people who come to see me for help with their pain.

What I like about ACT is that it’s flexible, allows people to notice what their mind tells them, but helps them to step back from that dictator within to make a choice about what to do. It’s the doing part (based on what matters in a person’s life) that I enjoy because it involves both graded exposure and graded reactivation. And if a person doesn’t relate to what they’ve been told about their pain, we don’t have to offer another explanation, we can help the person work out what works for them in the context of their own life.

So where are we with this now? Given that we can’t stop being social animals, and that we respond to one another without knowing it, I’m not sure we can avoid inadvertently using social and operant approaches as therapists. What we can do, though, is become more knowledgeable about behavioural approaches in pain management and rehabilitation – and that undoubtedly means learning a whole lot more psychology. Perhaps we might need to reframe our own understanding of psychology so we feel more comfortable with it – a bit like explaining pain and cognitive functional therapy have both helped us feel OK to step into doing what has often been the territory of psychologists.

Batho, A., Kneale, D., Sutcliffe, K., & Williams, A. C. C. (2021, Oct 1). Sufficient conditions for effective psychological treatment of chronic pain: a qualitative comparative analysis. Pain, 162(10), 2472-2485. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000002242

Beeckman, M., Hughes, S., Kissi, A., Simons, L. E., & Goubert, L. (2019, Oct). How an Understanding of Our Ability to Adhere to Verbal Rules Can Increase Insight Into (Mal)adaptive Functioning in Chronic Pain. Journal of Pain, 20(10), 1141-1154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2019.02.013

Butler, S. (2017). The wit and wisdom of Wilbert (Bill) Fordyce (1923-2009). Scandinavian Journal of Pain, 16(1), 160-163.

Leake, H. B., Moseley, G. L., Stanton, T. R., O’Hagan, E. T., & Heathcote, L. C. (2021, Oct 1). What do patients value learning about pain? A mixed-methods survey on the relevance of target concepts after pain science education. Pain, 162(10), 2558-2568. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000002244

Adam’s slow recovery


Not long ago I wrote about Adam Meakins back pain, and the astonishing response he’s had from fellow clinicians as he’s documented his recovery. Sadly, the polarised views of how therapists should approach a person with low back pain show me just how appallingly badly we adhere to low back pain guidelines… and worse, the kind of language and attitudes shown to a colleague who knows what he’s doing, demonstrates why change is so very slow.

What do I mean? Well, Adam has been following evidence-based low back pain guidelines that haven’t really changed a great deal since the advent of New Zealand’s “Yellow Flags” and guide to low back pain published waaaaay back in 1997. I’ve jumped to the NICE guidelines, as an example of one guideline, but you could look to many others.

NICE suggest these steps:

Assess for alternative diagnoses – in particular, “cancer, infection, trauma or inflammatory disease such as spondyloarthritis”

Risk assessment – basically, sorting people into those who are pretty OK with their pain, non-distressed and recommending those people receive “reassurance, advice to keep active and guidance on self-management.”

If Adam was distressed, or had a whole lot of risk factors for ongoing disability, then he might benefit from “more complex and intensive support for people with low back pain.” And yes, this mentions exercise programmes, manual therapy, psychological approaches.

Imaging – is not recommended, with imaging only used if the result is likely to change management.

Treatment – self-management, no orthotics or belts, no traction, and only offer manual therapy as part of an overall package that includes exercise.

No acupuncture, no electrotherapy.

Maybe use psychological therapies in conjunction with exercise.

Add in some NSAIDs

And don’t do much else…

In other words – exactly what Adam has been doing.

Why are there so many clinicians offering unsolicited opinions, without examining Adam, and without listening to his preferences, and without referring to the evidence?

What does this say about our clinical practice? What does it say about our confidence? What does it say about knowledge translation?

Most of all, what does this DO to the people we hope to help?

Seriously, folks. Watching the responses gives me nightmares.

I’ve been working in this field for 30 years now, and saying essentially the same thing about low back pain management for most of those years. I worry that an enormous business is built around scaring people, offering treatments with limited effect, for a condition that is common and responds well to doing normal movements.

In fact, one gripe I do have with the NICE guidelines is that they utterly and completely ignore daily life activities that a person needs to return to, and quickly. There’s nothing on managing sleep – and Adam’s described really rotten sleep until two days ago. There’s nothing on how to manage washing yourself, driving your car, sitting at a desk, doing the grocery shopping, preparing a meal, care for kids (or older parents) – absolutely nothing on the daily life activities that people need and want to do.

But, then again, I would say this – occupational therapists are the profession concerned about daily doing. The context of every day life. Knowledge translation from clinic/gym/exercise to what people actually do in their daily routines. It looks oh so simple – until you have to do it.

Back to Adam’s slow recovery. As I’ve watched Adam’s videos, I’m struck with the thought that many people just don’t know what to say – and so offer advice because that’s one way to deal with their own disquiet at helplessness. Clinicians, we need to develop better skills at managing our OWN emotional responses. We need to develop greater skills at sitting with our uncertainty. We need to stop leaping in with unsolicited advice that we offer just because we’re not comfortable doing nothing.

Could we just, for a moment, stop thinking about our reactions – and listen to what Adam (and I’m sure a whole bunch of our patients, too) says he wants? Listening means stopping that inner voice that’s got the “good” advice. It means really hearing what a person says. And only formulating a verbal response after we’ve digested the meaning the person is trying to convey.

Kia kaha Adam. You’re a brave man, a strong man, and I have much respect for you.

When living with pain is too hard


**If you’re a person living with pain, and this headline caught your attention because you’re feeling it’s just too hard to carry on – PLEASE take a moment to seek help. If you’re feeling you can’t because they might judge you, or try to stop you feeling this way, at the very least give yourself an hour before you take any action. If that feels too long, give yourself a minute. Get through that, and give yourself another minute. And so on – until you’ve give yourself some time to let this awful feeling ease up a little. You can always revisit your decision to wait. Speak to someone – anonymously if you need to. There are helplines in every country. Phone one. Please.**

Living with persistent pain can be really hard, and clinicians, family and the person with pain can be worried about suicidal thoughts and possible actions. There’s good reason to be concerned, too, as a recent study from the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey shows.

Grocott, Sommer and El-Gabalawy (2021) used the data obtained from this Canadian Health Survey to explore the relationships between pain intensity and suicidality in people with arthritis, migraines and low back pain.

The first question is how many people in the overall population involved in this study had any of the three diagnostic groups – and, as expected and in line with many epidemiological studies, between 10.3% (migraines) and 18.1% (low back pain) indicated they had been diagnosed. The “usual” pain levels across all three groups were between 25.9 – 27.7% indicating their pain was “mild”, 52.5 – 54.5% said it was “moderate”, and 19.7 – 20.9% described it as “severe”. This does not surprise me one bit – moderate levels of pain intensity are really common, and, albeit acknolwedging the difficulty of rating pain intensity on a numeric scale and the complex relationship between pain intensity and interference with daily life, demonstrate just how necessary persistent pain services are as a health services priority.

The team then identified the rates of “lifetime” suicidality – these were measured using the following questions.

“you seriously thought about committing suicide or taking your own life” (i.e., suicide ideation; yes, no), “you made a plan for committing suicide” (i.e., suicide plans; yes, no), or “you attempted suicide or tried to take your own life” (i.e., suicide attempts; yes, no).

It’s important to note that this question asked about whether the person had ever, during their life, had these thoughts – not that they were currently present. Remember this as you interpret this study, because suicidal thoughts are relatively common but acting on those thoughts is less common.

The authors found that people who were usually in pain were more likely to have suicidal thoughts, plans or had made an attempt than those who had periods of time without pain (ie intermittent pain). The different rates were reasonably large, too – just in terms of ideation, between 18.7 – 34.0% of people who were usually in pain had suicidal thoughts as opposed to those with intermittent pain (10.5-16.6%), and this association was particularly strong for people with migraine. For people with low back pain, having pain all the time was associated with much greater odds of suicidal thoughts (1.79, 95% CI [1.19-2.68], p<.05).

Pain intensity was also a factor – lifetime suicidality prevalence increased as pain intensity increased, and this was relevant to all pain conditions measured, and especially amongst people with severe pain and migraines.

A good question to ask is whether the odds were the same for people with current mental illness as for those without – and using the magic of statistics, the authors found that this only held for some forms of pain. People with arthritis (note they didn’t identify the kind of arthritis people had) reported lower levels of suicidality even in the presence of mental ill health.

The authors point out that this is an interesting study in that yes, suicidality was higher in people with migraines, and similar to other studies, but their intriguing finding was that differences in the intensity of usual pain increased the odds, along with elevated odds if people reported higher levels of pain intensity.

Why did I choose to summarise this paper?

A few reasons: one is that as health professionals, we may not be aware of just how many people in our communities live with pain. It’s a lot – and this study only included specific diagnoses. Yet, at least in New Zealand, pain management services for people with pain are scarce.

Most people in New Zealand will maybe get referred to a physiotherapist, but it’s often difficult for people with persistent pain to raise their issues with pain with their health provider and for those providers to respond with empathy (Thompson, Dowell, Hilder, Macdonald, Stubbe & Alchin, 2021). This means that many people may not be seen by clinicians with confidence to help people with psychosocial aspects of their pain (eg Holopainen, Simpson, Piirainen, Karppinen, Schutze, O’Sullivan & Ken, 2020, Zangoni & Thompson, 2017) if they even indicate that this is a concern for them during the consultation.

Another reason is that many clinicians who work mainly in “physical” health may not know what to do if someone does disclose suicidal thoughts. It is confronting to hear someone say they don’t want to live any more – and knowing what to do next can feel highly risky. How does this fit within my scope of practice? What if I say something wrong and the person goes ahead and attempts suicide?

Note though, that this study didn’t look at current levels of suicidal thought – it’s lifetime prevalence. Perhaps people who have had occasion to think about killing themselves have a greater degree of vulnerability for persistent pain, particularly when pain is intense. We don’t know – but the authors speculate. Worth reading the paper in full to find out their thoughts.

My thoughts (briefly!) are:

  • Prepare ahead of time. We’ll all likely encounter a person who is really distressed, at the end of their tether, and indicates they’re thinking of harming themselves. Being prepared makes responding to this situation much easier.
  • Preparation should include writing a policy for your practice or your setting. It should include a list of people to contact in a psychiatric emergency (when a person indicates they’re ready to take action to harm themselves), as well as specific actions to take when talking to the person.
  • We’re not all psychologists and it’s not our job to be psychologists – all we’re asked to do in this kind of situation is be a human. What I mean by this is – listen, affirm that the person is feeling really bad and support them to access the help they need. This might mean calling the psychologist if you have one you work with regularly, or calling the person’s family doctor, or calling psychiatric emergency services.
  • Ensure you hand the person to someone who will take care of them. This means not letting them go off in their car without letting their family doctor know, even if they say they’re fine. For your own reassurance this is important.
  • Take care of yourself. Don’t just go on to see the next person waiting for you. Take some time to process what’s happened, what you did, and debrief with someone you trust. It doesn’t need to be a trauma counsellor – it’s just as useful to talk to your colleagues who know you and the kind of work you do. Go have a cup of coffee, go for a walk, give yourself space to recognise that you just helped someone who was really distressed. That’s an important job.
  • Don’t ignore the person and pretend they didn’t just say that. Affirm that they’re feeling rotten. Don’t trivialise it and suggest they should just harden up, or it’s not really that bad, or that they’re at fault for feeling this way. Just be gentle and human, and recognise the privilege you have – this person trusts you enough to say how they’re really feeling. It’s an honour. So if you can’t think of anything to say, just sit with them and bear witness to their distress. Hand them a tissue. Be there for them.

Oh, and in that paper, while 18.7 – 34.0% had suicidal thoughts over their lifetime, 7.2–14.5% had made actual plans, while 6.6–14.7% had made attempts. Don’t trivialise suicidal thoughts, but at the same time, don’t freak out that the person is going to kill themselves – just take action to support them, and in most cases, the thoughts will fade as the person gains hope.

Grocott, B., Sommer, J. L., & El-Gabalawy, R. (2021, Jun 28). Usual presence and intensity of pain are differentially associated with suicidality across chronic pain conditions: A population-based study. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 148, 110557. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2021.110557

Holopainen, M. R., Simpson, M. P., Piirainen, D. A., Karppinen, P. J., Schutze, D. R., Smith, P. A., O’Sullivan, P. P., & Kent, A. P. (2020, Jan 16). Physiotherapists’ perceptions of learning and implementing a biopsychosocial intervention to treat musculoskeletal pain conditions: a systematic review and metasynthesis of qualitative studies. Pain. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001809

Thompson, L., Dowell, A., Hilder, J., Macdonald, L., Stubbe, M., & Alchin, J. (2021, Jan 4). How do patients and General Practitioners talk about pain and negotiate empathy in consultations? A direct observational study. Health & Social Care in the Community. https://doi.org/10.1111/hsc.13259

Zangoni, G., & Thomson, O. P. (2017, 2//). ‘I need to do another course’ – Italian physiotherapists’ knowledge and beliefs when assessing psychosocial factors in patients presenting with chronic low back pain. Musculoskeletal Science and Practice, 27, 71-77. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.msksp.2016.12.015

Why I don’t trust my clinical reasoning: and why this matters


“See someone experienced” I hear people with pain say. “They’ll know what’s wrong with you.”

Well, based on the research I’ve read, I wouldn’t be so sure. In fact, I’m certain my own clinical reasoning is biased, prone to errors that I don’t notice, and influenced by factors that most clinicians would be horrified to think they, too, were influenced by.

Let me give you a few to ponder:

I’m interested in women and pain – and there’s a lot of evidence showing that women’s pain doesn’t get the same kind of diagnostic and management attention as men. Now part of this is due to the inherent bias in research where experimental studies often rely on male rats, mice and undergraduates because they don’t have those pesky hormonal fluctuations each month. Even volunteering to take part in a pain study has been found to be biased – people who volunteer have been shown to be more risk-taking and more extraverted (Skinner, 1982) – though to be fair this is an old study!

But contextual factors such as gender, distress and even the supposed diagnosis do influence judgements about pain intensity (Bernardes & Lima, 2011) including potentially life-threatening chest pain (Keogh, Hamid, Hamid & Ellery, 2004). Gender bias has been identified in a large literature review of gender bias in healthcare and gendered norms towards people with chronic pain (Samulowitz, Gremyr, Eriksson & Hensing, 2018).

And if you have the misfortune to be judged to have low trustworthiness and you’re a woman, you’re more likely to be thought to have less pain and to be exaggerating your pain (Schafer, Prkachin, Kaseweter & Williams, 2016). Beware if you’re overweight and a woman because you’ll be likely judged as having less intense pain, the pain will be judged as less interfering, more exaggerated and less related to “medical” factors – women’s pain in particular is likely to be judged as “psychological” and given psychological therapy rather than other treatments (Miller, Allison, Trost, De Ruddere, Wheelis, Goubert & Hirsch, 2018).

The weird thing is that the clinicians involved in these studies were oblivious to their bias. And let’s not even go there with people of colour or so-called “minority” groups such as LGBTQI.

So as clinicians our initial impressions of a person can lead us astray – and I haven’t even started with the contribution experience has on clinical reasoning. Let me go there then!

Something that cognitive psychologists have explored for some years now, is the type of thinking that we draw on for clinical reasoning. System one is “fast reasoning” – where we rapidly, instinctively and emotionally make decisions on the fly. Kahneman (1982) first described these two processes and noted that fast thinking gets better with rehearsal and are helpful especially for skilled clinicians needing to make decisions in pressured contexts, and draw on “pattern recognition” – or to be precise, draw on deviation from a recognised pattern (Preisz, 2019). System two is “slow reasoning” where decisions are made in a considered way, are not influenced by emotional state, and can be thought of as “rational.” Slow thinking is most useful where the situation is complex, where decisions need to weigh multiple pieces of information, where the situation might be novel, or where, for persistent pain in particular, there are multiple disease processes occurring.

OK, so we should choose system two, right? Not so fast! System one is hard to switch from – it’s what underpins “intuition” or “hunches” – and it gets more entrenched the more experienced we are. According to Preisz (2019), system one “seeks to form a coherent, plausible story by relying on association, memories, pattern matching and assumption.”

Why is system one thinking not so great? Well, we’re human. We’re human in the way we respond to any reasoning situation – we anchor on the first and most “plausible” ideas, and these might be unrelated to the actual presentation we see. For example, if we’ve been reading a journal article on a new treatment and its indications, it’s amazing how many people will present with those exact same indications in the next week! This is availability bias or anchoring bias. We’re also inclined to believe our own patients and judgements are different from “those people” – especially “those people” who might respond best to clinical guidelines. This means that even in the face of clear-cut research showing the lack of effects of knee arthroscopy (Brignardello-Petersen, Guyatt, Buchbinder, Poolman et al, 2017) an orthopaedic surgeon I know argued that “we choose our patients very carefully” – essentially arguing that his patients are different, and this approach is the best one.

If experienced clinicians find it hard to “unstick” from old practice, or move quickly to “intuitive” reasoning (even if it’s called “pattern recognition”), and if we all find it hard to recognise when we’re biased, or even that we are biased, what on earth should we do? All us old hands should retire maybe? All follow algorithms and not use “clinical judgement”? Take the “human” out of clinical management and use AI?

Some of these things might work. There is evidence that algorithms and AI can offer effective and (perhaps) less biased diagnosis and management than our unaided human brain (Kadhim, 2018) but there are also studies showing that direct comparisons between decision aids and clinical judgement are rarely made, and those that have been carried out don’t show superior results (Schriger, Elder, & Cooper, 2017). But watch this space: AI is a rapidly developing area and I predict greater use of this over time.

The risk with decision aids is – garbage in, garbage out. If we look at existing research we can see that male, pale and potentially stale dominates: this doesn’t bode well for people of colour, for women, for the unique and idiosyncratic combination of diseases a person can have, or for untangling the impact of disease on the person – in other words, disability and illness.

So, to summarise. We are all biased, and it’s best to acknowledge this to ourselves upfront and personal. We can then turn to strategies that may reduce the biases. For me, the one I turn to most often is a case formulation, using information gathered from a semi-structured interview and a standard set of questionnaires. These have been developed a priori so my biases in information gathering are limited. By taking time to follow a case formulation, my thinking is slowed to that more deliberative system two. At least some of the biases I know I’m prone to are mitigated.

And yet, I know I am biased. That’s why I use a supervision relationship to help me identify those biases, to be challenged and to reflect.

Bernardes, S. F., & Lima, M. L. (2011, Dec). A contextual approach on sex-related biases in pain judgements: The moderator effects of evidence of pathology and patients’ distress cues on nurses’ judgements of chronic low-back pain. Psychology & Health, 26(12), 1642-1658.

Brignardello-Petersen, R., Guyatt, G. H., Buchbinder, R., Poolman, R. W., Schandelmaier, S., Chang, Y., Sadeghirad, B., Evaniew, N., & Vandvik, P. O. (2017, May 11). Knee arthroscopy versus conservative management in patients with degenerative knee disease: a systematic review. BMJ Open, 7(5), e016114. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2017-016114

Kadhim, M. A. (2018). FNDSB: A fuzzy-neuro decision support system for back pain diagnosis. Cognitive Systems Research, 52, 691-700. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2018.08.021

Kahneman, D., Slovic, S. P., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge university press.

Keogh, E., Hamid, R., Hamid, S., & Ellery, D. (2004). Investigating the effect of anxiety sensitivity, gender and negative interpretative bias on the perception of chest pain. Pain, 111(1-2), 209-217.

Miller, M. M., Allison, A., Trost, Z., De Ruddere, L., Wheelis, T., Goubert, L., & Hirsh, A. T. (2018, Jan). Differential Effect of Patient Weight on Pain-Related Judgements About Male and Female Chronic Low Back Pain Patients. J Pain, 19(1), 57-66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2017.09.001

Preisz, A. (2019, Jun). Fast and slow thinking; and the problem of conflating clinical reasoning and ethical deliberation in acute decision-making. Journal of Paediatric Child Health, 55(6), 621-624. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpc.14447

Samulowitz, A., Gremyr, I., Eriksson, E., & Hensing, G. (2018). “Brave Men” and “Emotional Women”: A Theory-Guided Literature Review on Gender Bias in Health Care and Gendered Norms towards Patients with Chronic Pain. Pain Research and Management, 2018.

Schafer, G., Prkachin, K. M., Kaseweter, K. A., & Williams, A. C. (2016, Aug). Health care providers’ judgments in chronic pain: the influence of gender and trustworthiness. Pain, 157(8), 1618-1625. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000536

Schriger, D. L., Elder, J. W., & Cooper, R. J. (2017, Sep). Structured Clinical Decision Aids Are Seldom Compared With Subjective Physician Judgment, and Are Seldom Superior. Ann Emerg Med, 70(3), 338-344 e333. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annemergmed.2016.12.004

Skinner, N. F. (1982, 1982/12/01). Personality characteristics of volunteers for painful experiments. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 20(6), 299-300. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03330107

Knowledge gaps for working together


Whenever we work with someone living with pain, we form a team. A team, by definition, is “a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively towards a common and valued goal/objective/mission” (Salas et al., 1992). So while many clinicians work outside an interprofessional team, they are always working in a team consisting of at least the person with pain, and themselves.

There’s a good deal of research on teamwork, and a heap of references in pain management literature on the benefits and, indeed, the need, to work in a team for best outcomes (both in terms of effects for the person and in terms of cost-effectiveness). Gilliam and colleagues (2018) demonstrate that long-term outcomes are retained by participants attending an interdisciplinary pain rehabilitation programme, while Guildford and colleaguees (2018) also showed reductions in analgesic use during an interdisciplinary pain management programme. It’s not new news folks!

Teamwork is well-investigated in health, particularly interprofessional/interdisciplinary teamwork. Much of this research, however, is focused on nursing and medicine interactions, with rather less attention paid to allied health and nursing/medicine teamwork. This matters because while nursing and medicine are moving away from the old medical model, the professions probably represent the two most similar in terms of clinical models. And this matters because one thing that’s found to be important for good teamwork in health is having a shared mental model (for example – from operation room – Wilson, 2019).

All good so far – nothing new here, move along, right?

Hold it right there, folks.

You see, when we work together in a team, particularly for people with persistent pain, we often generate a heap of new information about the person we hope to help. In New Zealand, the person will have completed the ePPOC set of questionnaires, then there will probably have been some physical performance testing, maybe some basic ROM, and muscle testing, perhaps some daily life functioning tasks, certainly some more psychological questionnaires, if the person sees a medical practitioner, there will be the obligatory bloods, urine, perhaps imaging – you know what I mean! A heap of information that each clinician deems necessary and I haven’t yet gone into each clinician’s desire to “hear the story from the beginning again!”

What’s lacking in our research on teamwork in persistent pain is discussion about how we assemble this information so that we move from a multidisciplinary team – Multidisciplinary teams involve people from different health disciplines working alongside one another while using clinical models drawn from their own professional discipline (Körner, 2010) – to an interprofessional/interdisciplinary team – Interdisciplinary teams also involve people from different health disciplines working alongside one another but meet regularly to collaborate on treatment goals and priorities (Ruan & Kaye, 2016). There is limited hierarchy and considerable communication, cooperation and often overlap between team members (Körner, 2010).

Not only a lack of a shared mental model (because we all think our model is The Best), we also lack an understanding of team processes. How do we develop an effective way to communicate, to cooperate, to deal with conflict in an open and creative way, to coordinate our work so things happen at the right time, to be coached so that the team-as-a-whole moves in the same direction and new people coming to the team feel part of the culture? Not forgetting that teams work in an ever-changing context, and team membership changes over time, while the overall team culture is something that emerges from a team collective (Salas, et al., 2015).

Are pain rehabilitation teams different from teams working in older person’s health, or palliative care, or as part of a primary health team?

I suspect so, but I can’t find good research detailing how our pain teams are different. It’s like a black box of mystery (a bit like interprofessional pain management programmes – one murky black box out of which a person pops!)

I’m left with this feeling that because teams in pain management and rehabilitation have become scarce in most part of the US, and that this is where all the research funding lives, there’s not very much that we actually know. We don’t know who holds the positions of power – is it the medical practitioner? the psychologist? the physiotherapist? the occupational therapist? Who makes the call as to when it’s time to work with the person to move from pain reduction to living well alongside pain? Are the team members actually using a common model or are they really working in parallel? And how can a team be maintained over time – I’ve had the privilege of working in a very close-knit and effective team for some years, but I’ve seen that team become smaller, fragmented, more multidisciplinary than interprofessional, with limited attention to processes of induction, developing effective conflict management, and really becoming weakened.

There is one conclusion I can draw from the mountains of material I’ve been learning and it’s this: it’s impossible to put a bunch of clinicians together and call them a team without putting effort in to develop those processes I’ve listed above. And when was the last time you attended a CPD session on “how to work in a team?”

Gilliam, W. P., Craner, J. R., Cunningham, J. L., Evans, M. M., Luedtke, C. A., Morrison, E. J., Sperry, J. A., & Loukianova, L. L. (2018). Longitudinal Treatment Outcomes for an Interdisciplinary Pain Rehabilitation Program: Comparisons of Subjective and Objective Outcomes on the Basis of Opioid Use Status. J Pain, 19(6), 678-689. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2018.02.010

Guildford, B. J., Daly-Eichenhardt, A., Hill, B., Sanderson, K., & McCracken, L. M. (2018). Analgesic reduction during an interdisciplinary pain management programme: treatment effects and processes of change. Br J Pain, 12(2), 72-86. https://doi.org/10.1177/2049463717734016

Körner, M. (2010). Interprofessional teamwork in medical rehabilitation: a comparison of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary team approach. Clinical Rehabilitation, 24(8), 745-755. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269215510367538

Ruan, X., & Kaye, A. D. (2016). A Call for Saving Interdisciplinary Pain Management. J Orthop Sports Phys Ther, 46(12), 1021-1023. https://doi.org/10.2519/jospt.2016.0611

Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S. A., & Tannenbaum, S. I. (1992). Toward an understanding of team performance and training. In Teams: Their training and performance. (pp. 3-29). Ablex Publishing.

Salas, E., Shuffler, M. L., Thayer, A. L., Bedwell, W. L., & Lazzara, E. H. (2015). Understanding and Improving Teamwork in Organizations: A Scientifically Based Practical Guide. Human Resource Management, 54(4), 599-622. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.21628

Wilson, A. (2019). Creating and applying shared mental models in the operating room. Journal of Perioperative Nursing, 32(3), 33.

That elephant in the room thing


This weekend I was incredibly fortunate to speak at Le Pub Scientifique (the next one is the super intelligent Tasha Stanton!) about one part of our pain conversation that’s absent: how do we have a conversation about when pain persists and doesn’t respond to any treatments?

I still don’t have any research to show how we might broach this topic in a way that respects the person with pain, acknowledges just how poorly our treatments do, and provides a framework for us to collaborate. It’s like this big bogey sitting in our clinics that we pretend isn’t there.

Why do we need to have this conversation?

Well, one reason is that our treatments are pretty poor and by ignoring this reality we’re sitting there with our hands over our ears going “lalalalala” as if by NOT talking about it, it doesn’t happen.

Another is that people living with pain are put through the most awful process of being offered something (hope!), waiting to get that something (waiting, waiting, waiting…life on hold…), getting it (ooh! exciting!), waiting for it to work (waiting, waiting, waiting…life on hold…), then finding it doesn’t help (despair!). Rinse and repeat. The time spent waiting alone is such an incredible waste.

As a result of us not being brave enough to talk about it, people with pain are often thought of as The Problem. They get blamed for not responding. Blamed by family, friends, other health professionals and funding agencies, insurers and case managers, and worst of all: their own minds.

In 2007 I hit my head and sustained a concussion. For 18 months I wasn’t working full time because I’d need to come home and sleep for at least an hour. Even though I knew that my symptoms were real, and that it can take time to recover from concussion, I spent hours worrying that I was “exaggerating”, “taking things too hard”, “not working hard enough”, “not motivated enough.” Believe me, these thoughts do not help anyone, and they delayed my recovery by pushing me towards a depressive episode.

Imagine if you’re a person with pain that doesn’t respond and instead of being given consistent messages about it as I was with my concussion, you’re being told “Treatment X might be a good option”, or “Have you tried Y?” or “Maybe another investigation might help us sort it out?”

How might that erode your sense of self, your confidence in your own experience?

Now I’m not suggesting we say to people “Guess what, your pain is going to go on forever” – that would be horrible, uncaring and unfeeling.

This isn’t the same as pretending that pain isn’t there, gritting teeth and “just getting on with it”. This isn’t about being resigned to a life of suffering.

What I am suggesting is that we help people to become less afraid of their pain, and to begin to start adding life into their life. That by taking pain into account we can begin to build patterns of activity that move us towards what we value – and I doubt that many of us value waiting for the next healthcare appointment. It also doesn’t mean that people can’t at the same time seek pain reduction approaches – I’ve certainly tried a bunch over the years, sadly none of them have changed my pain one iota.

When a person seeks help for their pain, underlying that request is typically something much more pragmatic. It’s about how much pain is interfering with important things the person wants to be able to do. It’s also about what the pain might signify – is it cancer? does it mean I need to change my job? does it mean I’m succumbing to old age or the legacy of being reckless as a young person? Clinicians often forget to ask “if pain was less of a problem for you, what would you be doing?” Clinicians also forget to ask what the person’s main concern is about their pain.

Addressing these concerns will, I think, help us move the conversation away from which set of exercises is better, which gadget might be new and groovy, which dominant voice should be listened to, and whether someone is “right” or “wrong” about an approach to helping people.

So perhaps, as we begin to recognise that our treatments are not very effective (despite the occasional win! Just like the gambler’s occasional win), we can work towards helping people with pain move towards what matters in their lives – with pain as a companion in the back seat, rather than taking over the steering wheel. And perhaps, somewhere along the way, there will be a place to stop to offload this passenger, but knowing that we’ll always carry the memories and thoughts of having had it as part of our lives. Pain has taught me so much! I am stronger than I think, I am good at finding wiggle room, and I am more compassionate towards others who are newer to the journey.

Clinical reasoning models: what’s wrong with them?


I’ve been interested in clinical reasoning and models used in clinical reasoning for quite some time. Occupational therapy has several models, including the “occupational therapy problem solving process” by Lela Llorens, the Model of Human Occupation by Gary Kielhofner, and the Canadian Model of Occupational Performance by Polatajko, Townsend and Craik in 2007. All of these models were designed to support occupational therapy clinical reasoning processes, and to capture the essence of what occupational therapy is about.

When it comes to pain rehabilitation, I’ve found the occupational therapy models a little lacking in specificity for my clinical reasoning. I’ve also noticed similar problems with proposed clinical reasoning models for physiotherapy when considering pain.

Here’s the thing: if pain involves so many factors (call them biopsychosocial for want of a better all-encompassing term), and we don’t know which factors are relevant for this person at this time, clinical reasoning in pain rehabilitation is complex. Why? Well the problem with pain is that it’s full of ambiguity. Not so much for the person experiencing them, but certainly for the clinician trying to help.

Bear with me a minute. To me, clinical reasoning models help shape the factors we include and those we omit.

In writing that sentence I realise I’m assuming something crucial: that models are designed to help us predict and control what’s going on. Is that the purpose of a model? I quickly did a search and found this definition: “In science, a model is a representation of an idea, an object or even a process or a system that is used to describe and explain phenomena that cannot be experienced directly. Models are central to what scientists do, both in their research as well as when communicating their explanations… Models are a mentally visual way of linking theory with experiment, and they guide research by being simplified representations of an imagined reality that enable predictions to be developed and tested by experiment.” It’s from here.

OK, so in clinical reasoning what utility does a model need? I think a model needs to generate hypotheses that explain the unique presentation of this person, their problems, at this time. A nomothetic representation of what might be going on for this unique person.

Occupational therapists and physiotherapists, and probably psychologists, are all concerned less about impairment (that’s damage or dysfunction at the body structure level) than we are about the impact this has on functional limitations and on participation. This doesn’t mean we’re not interested in impairment, but our focus is much more likely to be on “and what impact does that have on what you need and want to do”. Occupational therapists, in particular, are concerned about “and how does this affect the way you participate in our world”.

But if we look at clinical reasoning models in our various professions I think there are some gaps. I don’t think our models invite us to generate hypotheses because the various clusters of information don’t seem to link together in a terribly coherent way. Yet – with all the information around us, there are some causal (or bidirectional) relationships we can consider.

For example, we know that if someone is very fearful of their pain, they’re likely to describe elevated physiological arousal, and they’re not as inclined to engage in movements they believe will exacerbate their pain.

A line of reasoning goes from Fear -> Physiological arousal and Fear -> Avoidance.

This simple set of hypotheses generates some ideas about what might help. Firstly we’d test the presence of fear – is it just happening in this moment, or is it something that’s been present consistently? Mostly we ask the person, but we could use a questionnaire measure of fear of pain. We could also test for physiological arousal – is this present? How do we know? We could use various biofeedback devices, or we could simply ask (or use a questionnaire). And of course we can test for fear-avoidance as a combined construct via questionnaire and/or behavioural testing.

This set of steps really just determines whether our hypotheses are present, so now we need to generate some treatments. In this case, we also draw on research and think about providing information – this, we hypothesise, should reduce reported fear. So we embark on some explanations about what’s going on – and we should see a reduction of fear on a measure of pain-related fear. But perhaps not on avoidance because we know that behaviour change requires more than simply information. We might also help the person down-regulate their excitable nervous system, reducing that “fear -> arousal” relationship. And finally we might begin doing some exposure work which acts on reducing fear in the presence of doing something scary (movements) and so reduce the relationship between fear -> avoidance.

What the example above shows us is what might happen once we’ve identified some potential phenomena that may be present. What it doesn’t show, and something I struggle to find in many clinical reasoning models, is how clinicians identify those phenomena. Why would someone think to ask about fear of pain? Especially if we believe that our job is to help reduce pain and pain’s the only reason the person isn’t doing things. And even more – if we think our job is to deal with “physical” and fail to recognise the relationship between “physical” and “feelings, beliefs”.

You see, I think broad “groups of factors to consider” belongs in the assessment, but we need something more tangible when formulating an individualised explanation. We need to be generating hypotheses about how these various factors interact and lead to a presentation – and while much of this will be conjecture initially, by generating various hypotheses we can then go on to test them – and ultimately establish the priorities for treatment in collaboration with the person. That’s much easier to do when we’ve fleshed out why the person isn’t able to do what’s important to them, and we’ve synthesised all the known factors in some explanatory model.

Is this complex? Yes – but who said it had to be easy? This is why we do the work we do, because it’s complex and “common sense” doesn’t cut it. And if our various professions really want to adopt a sociopsychobiological framework for pain, maybe our clinical reasoning models need to synthesise all these factors in some coherent way rather than simply plonking the groups of factors down without integrating what’s known about the relationships between variables from different domains.

Wacker, J. G. (1998). A definition of theory: research guidelines for different theory-building research methods in operations management. Journal of Operations Management, 16(4), 361-385.

Yazdani, S., Hosseinzadeh, M., & Hosseini, F. (2017). Models of clinical reasoning with a focus on general practice: A critical review. Journal of advances in medical education & professionalism, 5(4), 177-184.

Clinical reasoning & meaning-making (a long post)


Clinical reasoning is a cornerstone of evidence-based healthcare, in fact some would argue it’s the cornerstone of all healthcare. While there are many different processes, the ultimate purpose of clinical reasoning is to ensure the person seeking help has their needs identified then met, and the clinician has a basis upon which to decide which treatment they should offer.

The approach we use in clinical reasoning, including the information we prioritise and search for, and the way we synthesise the information to make sense of it will depend on the model we have to explain our treatment approach. For example, if we’re occupational therapists, we’re looking for information about the occupations the person wants and needs to do (identifying the person’s needs), and we search for information to help explain how and why this person is unable to manage their occupations at this time. Because occupational therapy is concerned with context – social, interpersonal and environmental, as well as looking at pathophysiological processes, we will also review psychosocial-spiritual factors (beliefs, attitudes, desires, interactions, values, etc) and the physical and social environment/s as part of our clinical reasoning.

Meaning making

But… there’s something missing from this picture of how we go about doing clinical reasoning: the very process of enquiring about “daily doing” (aka occupation) is likely to influence the person seeking help. There is a dynamic process involved in making sense of what’s going on between the clinician and the person. Some would call this “intersubjectivity” (Quintner & Cohen, 2016) meaning “a shared perception of reality between embodied agents… meanings expressed through performance and …perceived by others”, some would call it “embodiment” (Arntzen, 2018) meaning bodily aspects of human subjectivity and referring to my phenomenological body (the way I experience my body), and still others wouldn’t recognise it at all! I like to call it “meaning making” or the way that both parties make sense of what goes on in the “meet the therapist moment” as Benedetti (2011) puts it.

Much of the discussion about clinical reasoning refers to the way clinicians blend implicit/tacit knowledge (knowledge that’s so well-learned that it’s hard to state exactly what it is) with explicit/declarative knowledge (knowledge that we can articulate). Each profession has its own implicit body of knowledge that frames the way they approach the clinical problem. I think patients, or people seeking health care, also have implicit knowledge they bring to the clinical setting.

Some of the knowledge brought in from people seeking treatment is the inner sense that “something is wrong with me”. Without the sense that something is wrong, we don’t seek healthcare, and this can explain why problems like bowel cancer can go unnoticed until the disease is in an advanced state – because symptoms are either very subtle, or not present. With low back pain we know that for most people the sense that “something is wrong” is almost immediate, but may not evolve into treatment-seeking until the problem either doesn’t follow the typical path of recovery, or the pain begins to interfere with what’s important in daily life (Ferreira, Machado, Latimer, Maher, Ferreira, & Smeets, 2010).

We acquire the idea of “something is wrong with me” from personal experience (that queasy feeling just before you get seasick), from others around us (you’re looking really pale today, are you OK?), and from broader society (if your pain persists, see your health professional). But, from some of the qualitative studies I’ve been reading, I think we really start to notice and do something about our “something is wrong with me” intuition once we can’t do things that are important to us and help to define our sense of self (Darlow, Brown, Lennox Thompson, Hudson, Grainger, McKinlay & Abbott, 2018).

It’s clear to me that both the person seeking help and the clinician hold tacit knowledge, and that this knowledge/information is likely to influence clinical reasoning. And some of the implicit knowledge in both clinician and patient changes without either party recognising that’s what has happened.

Back to clinical reasoning and meaning making.

Something I noticed when developing my theory of living well with chronic pain was that many people with ongoing pain learn about the effects on daily doing by themselves (Lennox Thompson, Gage & Kirk, 2019). What I mean by this is they establish what they can and can’t do in mini-experiments (experiences) each day. This experimentation and experience is strongly influenced by the person’s interpretation of what the pain means – and the confidence they have to find ways to cope or deal with pain. Because so much of our knowledge about pain is based on acute pain that generally settles down quickly, it’s unsurprising that some interpretations of persistent pain go awry.

Given the impact of persistent pain is firstly on being able to do what’s important in a person’s life, it makes sense to me that our clinical reasoning should incorporate an understanding of what the person needs and wants to do. It also makes sense to me that we need to understand the person’s current perspective: their beliefs, assumptions and experience of what pain has interfered with. This doesn’t mean that the person’s perspective is 100% accurate with respect to what is going on in their body, because as I pointed out above, many of our beliefs about “what is wrong with me” are based on social constructs. Having said that, it doesn’t mean our clinical interpretation is any more “accurate” – it does, however, mean that until our perspectives align, we’re likely to have trouble developing a shared meaning of the problem. As Arntzen points out “there is a tendency in person-centered occupational therapy practice to consider only the patient-articulated experience and not the multiple layers of embodiment and co-construction of meaning within the therapeutic relationship” (Arntzen, 2018).

One form of clinical assessment, perhaps one that’s under-used, is as Arntzen (2018) describes, the ongoing dialogue between a clinician and the person as the person enacts movements or engages in occupations. This kind of meaning making involves physical and cultural contexts (I may visit a cafe with my client to see how she navigates the tables and people, how she stands and then sits while drinking her coffee, and how she moves from this location to her car); it involves conversations with her about what is going through her mind as she encounters these situations; I may change the location of our next session on the basis of interpreting her performance in this context, adapting my voice, my body language to convey my assessment of this performance.

At the same time, the person I’m working with is also making meaning of how she managed in this situation. From my nonverbal and verbal response to what she does, she may infer that I think she’s doing fine, or that I’m worried about her capabilities. You’ll notice that much of this implicit shared meaning making is not verbal – it’s inference, and may well be inaccurate.

I really like Arntzen’s description of the way clinician and person can work together to develop a shared understanding of “the problems” – I’m quoting it whole:

An embodied intersubjective reasoning can be about questioning how the patient senses their changed body during performance and what it means for his or her ability or obstacles to act, learn, and change. This mode of reasoning can help the occupational therapist problematizing the patients’ performance, capabilities, and possibilities as an interrelated process between action failure, lived habitual practice, and ongoing and shared meaning-making.

Arntzen, 2018

I also love this depiction of therapy: Therapy is a context- specific dialogue between two interpretive, embodied agents, in which the outcomes of their relationship are not given in advance (Arntzen, 2018).

How can all clinicians use this perspective?

While Arntzen is an occupational therapy commentator, and I have framed this post through an occupational therapy lens, I think there is much that other movement and doing-oriented clinicians can draw on. The “ambiguous body” is also core to much of physiotherapy: the person’s experience of being within a body with its attendant limitations, and the body through which goals and aims and life is lived. The ambiguity is particularly relevant in pain where “not being myself” dominates the person’s sense of self – because the experience of pain and movement renders familiar actions as different and needing more attention than usual, or failing where it hadn’t before. Doing is disrupted, and therefore “being” the person I know myself to be is also disrupted. The way the person experiences his body can be influenced by an empathic clinician, to help him recognise changes, or become aware of a return to familiarity.

Arntzen (2018) also refers to tools or the things we use during daily doing – the toothbrush, the car, the clothing we wear, the phone we use that now doubles as computer, camera, aide memoir. Although we can think of these things as “things” have you noticed that you talk about “my phone”, “my car” – and the choice of phone or car situates you in your social environment. If you’ve ever picked up another person’s phone by accident, it just doesn’t feel right even before you recognise that it’s not your own! Occupational therapists incorporate “things” as part of enabling occupation, as do physiotherapists who may incorporate walking aids, temporary splints, or use gym equipment as part of therapy. I think it’s worth considering how the person experiences these things – are they integrated into a sense of self? (think of those tatty neoprene wrist splints worn for months, if not years; and also ponder the gym equipment that still seems alien even after completing a six week rehabilitation programme).

Finally, the crucial element of what we attend to during therapy – and the things we focus on and draw the person to notice – is about our own embodied presence. Arntzen says “Through moment-to-moment interaction, the therapist can have an effect on what becomes foreground and what is background for the patient during the act. The therapist may support or hinder the patient’s habitual practice, or may facilitate or hold back the patient’s own capability to explore new strategies, develop compensatory techniques, and find alternative solutions” (Arntzen, 2008). I’ve often described this process when teaching about eliciting automatic thoughts during movements (eg riding a bike or walking over a slippery floor) – if we attend to “purity of movement” or biomechanics or some externalised idea of how someone ought to do something, we’re likely to elicit more of that and it may be unhelpful. If we collaborate with the person and interconnect we’re just as likely to learn from him as he is from us. I like Schell’s (2014) description of this form of clinical reasoning: ecological professional reasoning.

Concluding

To conclude this lengthy post, I think too often clinicians have viewed their role as dominant, and what they say or ask the person to do as the primary therapeutic agent. I also think there’s a reason someone seeks help from a clinician. Relying only on one form of knowledge without integrating other forms (from the other person, using only language, being primary active agent etc) doesn’t seem to represent what actually goes on in therapy.

Many people with persistent pain learn what they can and can’t do on the basis of experiments that (often, at least in our most disabled people) lead to failure and recognising “I can’t do that any more”. Our approach has been to administer corrective exercises, experiences in moving differently, but we may well have forgotten both the contextual nature of doing and the experiential interpretation made by the embodied person. If we want to help people return to “feeling like themselves” maybe we need attend more carefully to the “what it is like” to experience this new experience, and then support the person to experiment in their own context. I’d call this knowledge translation, or perhaps occupational therapy.

Arntzen, C. (2018). An embodied and intersubjective practice of occupational therapy. OTJR Occupation, Participation and Health, 38(3), 173–180. https://doi.org/10.1177/1539449217727470

Benedetti, F., & Amanzio, M. (2011). The placebo response: How words and rituals change the patient’s brain. Patient Education and Counseling, 84(3), 413-419. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pec.2011.04.034

Brooks, R., & Parkinson, S. (2018). Occupational formulation: A three-part structure. British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 81(3), 177–179. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308022617745015

Darlow, B., Brown, M., Thompson, B., Hudson, B., Grainger, R., McKinlay, E., & Abbott, J. H. (2018). Living with osteoarthritis is a balancing act: an exploration of patients’ beliefs about knee pain. BMC Rheumatology, 2(1), 15.

Ferreira, M. L., Machado, G., Latimer, J., Maher, C., Ferreira, P. H., & Smeets, R. J. (2010). Factors defining care-seeking in low back pain–A meta-analysis of population based surveys. European Journal of Pain, 14(7), e1-e7. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpain.2009.11.005

Lennox Thompson, B., Gage, J., & Kirk, R. (2019). Living well with chronic pain: a classical grounded theory. Disability and Rehabilitation, 1-12. doi:10.1080/09638288.2018.1517195

McCambridge, J., Witton, J., & Elbourne, D. R. (2014). Systematic review of the Hawthorne effect: new concepts are needed to study research participation effects. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 67(3), 267–277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2013.08.015

Quintner, J., & Cohen, M. (2016). The challenge of validating the experience of chronic pain: the importance of intersubjectivity and reframing. In Meanings of Pain (pp. 281-293). Springer, Cham.

From the particular to the general – Clinical reasoning in the real world


From the particular to the general –
Clinical reasoning in the real world

I make no secret of my adherence to evidence-based healthcare. I think using research-based treatments, choosing from those known to be effective in a particular group of people in a specific context helps provide better healthcare. But I also recognise problems with this approach: people in clinical practice do not look like the “average” patient. That means using a cookie cutter, or algorithm as a way to reduce uncertainty in practice doesn’t, in my humble opinion, do much for the unique person in front of me.

I’ve been reading Trisha Greenhalgh’s recent paper “Of lamp posts, keys, and fabled drunkards: A perspectival tale of 4 guidelines”, where she describes her experience of receiving treatment based on the original description given for her “fall”. The “fall” was a high-impact cycle accident with subsequent limb fractures, and at age 55 years, she was offered a “falls prevention” treatment because she’d been considered “an older person with a fall”. Great guidelines practice – wrong application!

Greenhalgh goes on to say “we should avoid using evidence-based guidelines in the manner of the fabled drunkard who searched under the lamp post for his keys because that was where the light was – even though he knew he’d lost his key somewhere else”

Greenhalgh (2018), quoting Sir John Grimley Evans

When someone comes to see us in the clinic, our first step is to ask “what can I do for you?” or words to that effect. What we’re looking for is the person’s “presenting symptoms”, with some indication of the problem we’re dealing with. Depending on our clinical model, we may be looking for a diagnostic label “rheumatoid arthritis” or a problem “not sleeping until three hours after I go to bed”.

What we do next is crucial: We begin by asking more questions… but when we do, what questions do we ask?

Do we follow a linear pattern recognition path, where we hypothesise that “rheumatoid arthritis” is the problem and work to confirm our hypothesis?

Our questions might therefore be: “tell me about your hands, where do they hurt?” and we’ll be looking for bilateral swelling and perhaps fatigue and family history and any previous episodes.

Or do we expand the range of questions, and try to understand the path this person took to seek help: How did you decide to come and see me now? Why me? Why now?

Our questions might then be: “what do you think is going on? what’s bothering you so much?”

Different narratives for different purposes

Greenhalgh reminds us of Lonergan (a Canadian philosopher), as described by Engebretsen and colleagues (2015), where clinical enquiry is described as a complicated process (sure is!) of 4 overlapping, intertwined phases: (a) data collection – of self reported sensations, observations, otherwise known as “something is wrong and needs explaining”; (b) data interpreting “what might this mean?” by synthesising the data and working to recognise possible answers, or understanding; (c) weighing up alternative interpretations by judging; and (d) deciding what to do next, “what is the right thing to do”, or deliberation.

Engebretsen and colleagues emphasise the need to work from information from the individual to general models or diagnoses (I’d call this abductive reasoning), and argue that this process in the clinic should be “reflexive” and “informed by scientific evidence” but warn that scientific evidence can’t be replaced simply by reflexive approaches.

The reason for conceptualising clinical reasoning in this way is that a narrative primarily based on confirming a suspicion will likely reduce the number of options, narrow the range of options considered, and if it’s focused on diagnosis, may well over-ride the person’s main concern. A person may seek help, not because he or she wants a name or even treatment, but because of worries about work, the impact on family, or fears it could be something awful. And without directly addressing those main concerns, all the evidence-based treatments in the world will not help.

Guidelines and algorithms

Guidelines, as many people know, are an amalgamation of RCT’s and usually assembled by an esteemed group of experts in an attempt to reduce unintended consequences of following poorly reasoned treatment. They’re supposed to be used to guide treatment,  supporting clinical reasoning with options that, within a particular population, should optimise outcomes.

Algorithms are also assembled by experts and aim to provide a clinical decision-making process where, by following the decision tree, clinicians end up providing appropriate and effective treatment.

I suppose as a rather idiosyncratic and noncomformist individual, I’ve bitterly complained that algorithms fail to acknowledge the individual; they simplify the clinical reasoning process to the point where the clinician may not have to think critically about why they’re suggesting what they’re suggesting. At the same time I’ve been an advocate of guidelines – can I be this contrary?!

Here’s the thing: if we put guidelines in their rightful place, as a support or guide to help clinicians choose useful treatment options, they’re helpful. They’re not intended to be applied without first carefully assessing the person – listening to their story, following the four-step process of data collection, data interpretation, judging alternatives, and deciding on what to do.

Algorithms are also intended to support clinical decision-making, but not replace it! I think, however, that algorithms are more readily followed… it’s temptingly easy to go “yes” “no” and make a choice by following the algorithm rather than going back to the complex and messy business of obtaining, synthesising, judging and deciding.

Perhaps it’s time to replace the term “subjective” in our assessment process. Subjective has notions of “biased”, “emotional”, “irrational”; while objective implies “impartial”, “neutral”, “dispassionate”, “rational”. Perhaps if we replaced these terms with the more neutral terms “data collection” or “interview and clinical testing” we might treat what the person says as the specific – and only then move to the general to see if the general fits the specific, not the other way around.

 

Engebretsen, E., Vøllestad, N. K., Wahl, A. K., Robinson, H. S., & Heggen, K. (2015). Unpacking the process of interpretation in evidence‐based decision making. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 21(3), 529-531.

Greenhalgh, T. (2018). Of lamp posts, keys, and fabled drunkards: A perspectival tale of 4 guidelines. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 24(5), 1132-1138. doi:doi:10.1111/jep.12925