Research

Teamwork: Gaps or overlaps?


For many years now, interprofessional/multidisciplinary teams have been considered the best model for delivering pain management. This stems from studies conducted right back as far as J J Bonica in 1944 (Bonica, 1993), and originally referred to teams consisting of several medical specialties. Bonica later initiated a multidisciplinary/interdisciplinary pain programme in 1960, including 20 people from 14 medical specialties “and other health professions”. In 1977, Bonica and Butler classified pain programmes into five groups – major comprehensive multidisciplinary programmes – more than six disciplines and involved in education and research; comprehensive multidisciplinary – four to six disciplines and involved in education and research; small multidisciplinary – 2 or 3 disciplines; syndrome-oriented specialising in single diagnoses; and modality-oriented using a single treatment. There were, at the time, 327 facilities around the world – including New Zealand (The Auckland Regional Pain Service).

Bonica didn’t comment on the team structure of these facilities, nor on the mix of “other health professions” involved. There has been a significant reduction in the numbers of comprehensive pain management centres, particularly in North America since the 1990’s. Fragmented, unidimensional treatment seems to be far more common than integrated multidimensional approaches.

Why might teamwork and structure of teams be important in pain management?

I like this discussion of why interprofessional/interdisciplinary teams might be more effective in pain management than multidisciplinary: “Multidisciplinary teams are unable to develop a cohesive care plan as each team member uses his or her own expertise to develop individual care goals. In contrast, each team member in an interdisciplinary team build on each other’s expertise to achieve common, shared goals. Therefore, it is crucial to indicate that multidisciplinary teams work in a team; whereas, interdisciplinary teams engage in teamwork.”

The argument for interprofessional teams in pain management is that by drawing on a common model of pain, each profession can align their treatments to meet the person’s goals, using a common framework, language and broad principles. But, and it’s a big but, this model depends on mutual trust, respect and time spent together developing a common understanding of each team member’s contributions. This is not something in which many health professionals have much training. For a good discussion of ways to foster good dynamics, Youngwerth and Twaddle’s 2011 paper is a nice place to start.

Why write about this now?

I was prompted to write about this because of a set of questions I was posed by a group of clinicians from another profession. We ostensibly work in a team, under the ACC Pain Contracts which specify a “multidisciplinary” approach. The questions, however, reflected both a lack of knowledge about pain management group programmes, and a lack of respect for the clinical skills provided by the people who deliver the programme I’ve developed. And it’s not the first instance of such behaviour.

I rarely criticise New Zealand healthcare policy, at least not on the pages of this blog. In this instance, though, I think it’s time to point out some of the issues that are present in the way pain contracts are being delivered since late 2016.

For those who’re not aware, ACC is NZ’s only personal injury insurer, owned by the country, with no-fault, 24 hour cover. That means anyone who has an accidental injury in NZ firstly can’t sue, and secondly has their treatment and rehabilitation paid for. Like most personal injury insurance companies, ACC’s main problem is the burden of long-term claims where often the main issue preventing return to work and case closure is persistent pain. As a result, pain services have been provided under ACC rehabilitation policy under a “provider-funder split” model since 2000.

ACC contracts providers to deliver pain management services. These services were to involve a number of designated professions, and these professionals were to be at least two years post-graduation, and to have completed postgraduate education in pain and pain management. And no, I don’t think a weekend course counts as “postgraduate education”. Unfortunately, the remuneration under these contracts is incredibly low. Remuneration rates are pre-determined by ACC, so that occupational therapy and physiotherapy are given one hourly rate, psychologists have a higher rate, and medical practitioners have the highest rate of all. There’s no variation in rates to fund experienced clinicians, so everyone gets the same amount irrespective of skill level. There is little to no allowance for team meetings, and there’s no allowance for screening or reporting included in the funding for the group programme I’ve developed.

Aside from the low funding, there are other concerns for me. There has been no auditing of the providers delivering these services. As a result, large businesses naturally try to maximise profit, employing entry-level clinicians for the contracts. Incredibly challenging for new graduates who have had limited exposure to persistent pain and pain management, and often apply acute pain management principles to chronic conditions. And that risks prolonging disability and exacerbating distress of people needing help.

Secondly, because these are new contracts, with quite different requirements from earlier iterations, groups have had to recruit a great many clinicians. Some of those clinicians presumed, I think, that their professional qualification is sufficient to work with people who have persistent pain. Even if their training had no pain content. ACC considers professional registration to be quite sufficient to practice in this area. While some of these clinicians are very experienced – pain management is not simple, and it is specialised. I have heard of practitioners continuing to use gate control theory as their primary “pain education”. While it’s an advance on being told you have “somatic disorder”, it doesn’t exactly reflect modern pain concepts. Again, using outdated information risks prolonging disability and exacerbating distress in a group of vulnerable people.

Teams to deliver pain contracts were often assembled in haste. Processes of induction, continuing education, developing a common clinical model, knowledge of other professionals’ contributions have all suffered as a result. Multidisciplinary practice is the norm – as one person I know used to put it, it’s “serial monotherapy”. Decision-making processes haven’t been developed, and integrating a clinical model common to all – and therefore abolishing a hierarchical structure – has just not happened. Instead a hierarchical, patch-protecting, and disjointed model where professionals are pitted against one another to gain some kind of dominance is emerging. A far cry from a mutually-respectful, integrated, non-hierarchical interprofessional team environment that research suggests is best for delivering pain management (Gatchel, McGeary, McGeary & Lippe, 2014).

When high value, low cost treatments for persistent pain are under-funded, and when costly yet ineffective treatments such as surgery continue being delivered, it’s the people who most need help who are harmed. I suppose what’s even more concerning is that despite 1 in 5 NZers living with pain lasting more than three months, and ACC claimants representing a small proportion of those living with pain, there is no New Zealand strategy for chronic pain management. People on ACC are, in most ways, rather lucky despite the failings of this contracting system.

The pain contracts could have represented an opportunity for innovation and an expansion of understanding between professions, what has happened instead is a tendency to deliver formulaic, ritualised programmes with gaps and overlaps, as a result of underfunding, poor quality control and both ignorance and power play in some instances.

We used to be world leaders in pain management. We have failed to capitalise on our headstart.  We should do better. We must do better for people living with pain.

 

Bonica, J. J. (1993). Evolution and current status of pain programs. Journal of Pharmaceutical Care in Pain & Symptom Control, 1(2), 31-44. doi:10.1300/J088v01n02_03

Gatchel, R. J., McGeary, D. D., McGeary, C. A., & Lippe, B. (2014). Interdisciplinary chronic pain management: past, present, and future. American Psychologist, 69(2), 119.

Youngwerth, J., & Twaddle, M. (2011). Cultures of interdisciplinary teams: How to foster good dynamics. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 14(5), 650-654.

Clinical reasoning in pain – emotions


The current definition of pain includes the words “unpleasant sensory and emotional experience” so we would be surprised if we encountered a person with pain who wasn’t feeling some sort of negative emotion, am I right? Yet… when we look at common pain assessments used for low back pain, items about emotions or worries are almost always included as indicators of negative outcomes (for example, STarTBack – Worrying thoughts have been going through my mind a lot of the time, I feel that my back pain is terrible and it’s never going to get any better, In general I have not enjoyed all the things I used to enjoy). And while the screening questionnaires have been validated, particularly for predictive validity (ie higher scores obtained on these measures are associated with poorer outcomes), I wonder how much we know, or think we know, about the relationship between emotions and pain. Perhaps its time for a quick review…

Firstly, let’s define emotions (seems easy!) “Emotions are multicomponent phenomena; (2) emotions are two-step processes involving emotion elicitation mechanisms that produce emotional responses; (3) emotions have relevant objects; and (4) emotions have a brief duration.” (Sander, 2013). There are thought to be six evolutionarily shaped basic emotions such as joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and surprise (Ekman, 1992); but as usual there are complications to this because emotions are also examined in terms of their valence – negative or positive – and arousal (similar to intensity, but in terms of how much our physiology gets excited).

There are two main brain areas involved in processing both pain and unpleasant stimuli in general are the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. These areas don’t exclusively deal with pain but with stimuli that are especially salient to people (remember last week’s post?), and researchers are still arguing over whether particular areas are responsible for certain emotions, or whether “emotions emerge when people make meaning out of sensory input from the body and from the world using knowledge of prior experience” based on basic psychological operations that are not specific to emotions (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 129) . I’m quoting from an excellent book “The neuroscience of pain, stress and emotions” by Al, M. Absi, M.A. Flaten, and M. Rogers.

Now researchers have, for years, been interested in the effects of emotions on pain – there is an enormous body of literature but luckily some good reviews – see Bushnell et al., 2013; Roy, 2015 ;  Wiech and Tracey, 2009. What this research shows, essentially, is that pain is reduced by positive emotions, and increased by negative emotions. Now we need to be somewhat cautious about over-interpreting these results because they’re mainly conducted in experimental designs with acute experimental pain – people are shown pictures that elicit certain emotions, then poked or zapped, and asked to rate their pain (and their emotions, usually). It’s thought that the way these emotions influence pain is via our descending inhibitory pathways. Now the situation with real people experiencing pain that is not experimentally administered is probably slightly different – a lot more salient, a lot more worrying, and far less controlled. Nevertheless it’s worth knowing that when you’re feeling down, you’re likely to rate your pain more highly. If the emotion-eliciting stimuli are particularly arousing (ie they’re REALLY interesting) then the effect on pain ratings is greater. Experimenters also found pain reduces responses to pleasant stimuli, but there isn’t such a strong relationship with negative stimuli.

The valence (positiveness or negativeness – if that’s a word LOL) activates motivational systems either pleasant = appetitive, or unpleasant = defensive. Arousal or alertness gives us a clue as to how much motivation we have to either move towards or away from the stimulus. The degree of arousal affects our pain experience – so the more negative and angry we are, we rate our pain more highly; while the happier and jollier we are, we rate our pain as less intense. BUT, as for most things in pain, it’s complex – so once we get more than moderately angry/alert/aroused, the less we experience pain. The diagram below shows this kind of relationship – from the same book I quoted above (it’s worth getting!).

Does this mean we should freak people out so they experience less pain? Don’t be dumb! Being that alert is really exhausting. But what this diagram can explain is why some people, when they’re first attending therapy and are asked to do something out of the ordinary and just so slightly threatening (like lifting weights, or jumping on a treadmill) might report higher pain intensity – because we’ve caught them at the moderate arousal level where pain is facilitated.

Clinically, what this information means is that if we’re hoping to improve someone’s pain via pleasant or positive emotions, we’d better make sure they’re fairly high energy/arousing – a hilarious comedy perhaps – because lower intensity pleasure doesn’t affect pain much.

We should, at all costs, avoid eliciting fear and worry, or anger in the people we treat – because this increases pain intensity. This means giving people time to get used to our setting, what we’re asking them to do, and the intensity of whatever activity we’re going to do with them. In graded exposure, we should give people skills in mindfulness well before we begin doing the exposure component – because it’s likely to evoke higher than usual pain intensity if they can’t “be with” the increased anxiety that emerges during this kind of treatment.

And finally, if someone is experiencing anger, depression, sadness or anxiety – this is a normal psychological reaction integral to our experience of pain. It’s not necessarily pathological – though it probably increases the pain intensity the person reports.

I think we could promote far more scheduling pleasurable experiences as a routine part of therapy. What makes people smile, feel joy, have a good belly laugh? When was the last time they watched a comedy or joked with their family? Therapy can be fun, just see my friend Alice Hortop’s work on comedy as therapy (https://alicehortop.com/)!

 

 

Ekman, P.  (1992). An argument for basic emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200.

 

 

 

Flaten, M. A. (2016). The neuroscience of pain, stress, and emotion : Psychological and clinical implications. In Al, M. Absi, M. A. Flaten, & M. Rogers (Eds.), Neuroscience of Pain, Stress, and Emotion: Amsterdam, Netherlands : Elsevier.

K.A. Lindquist, T.D. Wager, H. Kober, E. Bliss-Moreau, L.F. Barrett, (2012). The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35 (03),  121–143

 

 

Roy, M. (2015). Cerebral and spinal modulation of pain by emotions and attention. Pain, Emotion and Cognition, 35–52.

 

Sander, D. (2013). Models of emotion: the affective neuroscience approach. in J.L. Armony, P. Vuilleumier (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of human affective neuroscience, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 5–56

 

 

 

Occupational therapists’ knowledge of pain


I am mightily bothered by health professionals’ lack of knowledge about pain. Perhaps it’s my “teacher” orientation, but it seems to me that if we work in an area, we should grab as much information about that area as possible – and pain and pain management is such an important part of practice for every health professional that I wonder why it’s so often neglected. So, to begin exploring this, I completed a search looking at occupational therapists’ knowledge of pain – and struck gold,  kinda.

Angelica Reyes and Cary Brown conducted a survey of Canadian occupational therapists, to explore how well occupational therapists knew their stuff.

Members of the Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists were asked to participate and a total of 354 therapists (mainly from Ontario, Alberta and Nova Scotia) took part. Curious that few were from British Columbia where I know of quite a few occupational therapists working in the area, but there you have it.  Over half of the respondents had 10 years or less experience – so they were fairly recent graduates and should reflect a “current” educational bias. Only 5% of the total number of members of CAOT responded, so this is a fraction of the occupational therapists working in Canada – but you’d think the motivated (ie knowledgeable) would be more likely to respond than those who don’t work in the area….

What they found was consistent with previous studies (prior to 2000) showing that these respondents, who were surveyed using the City of Boston’s Rehabilitation Professionals’ Knowledge and Attitude Survey (Rochman & Herbert, 2015), had disturbing “potential knowledge gaps” in the following areas:

  • children’s ability to feel pain;
  • use of analgesics in orthopedic pain
  • use of nondrug treatments
  • thermal modalities
  • prevalence of malingering
  • impact of therapists’ values on assessment of veracity
  • mind/body dualism in chronic pain
  • measurement of pain intensity
  • effect of under-treatment on chronicity
  • prevalence of patients who over-report pain
  • prevalence ofpatients who are likely to become addicted if treated with opioids.

Of particular concerns was 45.7% of participants believed that malingering is common; 38% believed that pain intensity can be objectively measured, 39.7% believed people with pain over-report their pain, and 59.8% believed that opioid addiction is likely to occur in more than 5% of the patient population.

OUCH!

So, it seems that these occupational therapists had some very outdated ideas about pain, and in particular, seem to have missed the point that because pain is a biopsychosocial experience, we have no way to determine whether someone is “faking” – or malingering.

Now, I will lay good money on a bet that if we were to carry out this very same survey amongst any other health profession, we’d still arrive at these rather unsavoury findings. Folks, I live in a pain nerd bubble and I still hear these kinds of discussions amongst knowledgeable health professionals, so it’s unsurprising that so many people hold these beliefs. Beliefs that will hamper developing good relationships with the people we want to help, and beliefs that fly in the face of what we know about pain.

I am SO not pointing the finger at Canadian occupational therapists, neither am I pointing the finger at my profession alone. I think this lack of understanding reflects many things:

  1. Pain is a complex experience, and the legacies of ancient models lingers everywhere (dualism, medical model, reductionism, etc);
  2. We devote very little time in our professional training to learning about pain – and often, it’s limited to “here is the nociceptive system”;
  3. The research around pain has exploded over the last 15 years – it’s hard to keep up, which is why I blog;
  4. The problem of persistent pain is under-estimated, so if a person works in paediatrics, older person’s health, neurology, brain injury, spinal cord injury – it’s quite probable that pain is almost completely ignored, because “it’s not relevant”. After all, pain is something for specialist pain services, yes? NO
  5. Prevailing attitudes within the healthcare community are that pain is a difficult area to understand – and “should” be treated with medication or surgery otherwise….

You can see that this year’s IASP Global Year for Excellence in Pain Education has much to do.

Did you know that IASP have produced NINE comprehensive curricula – including occupational therapy  (thank you to Emeritus Professor Jenny Strong, Professor Cary Brown and Dr Derek Jones for developing this wonderful resource). This means there is no reason for us not to begin integrating this import area of practice into our undergraduate training.

Research examining occupational therapy’s contribution within pain management is in its infancy – but oh how my occupational therapy heart went pit-a-pat when, at the Australian and New Zealand Pain Society Scientific Meeting I presented alongside two other occupational therapists with PhD’s (or nearly there!) to a room full of clinicians, not just occupational therapists. While we have little specifically occupational therapy research, occupational therapists have been and are continuing to be part of research efforts around the world. And what clinicians do is apply what is learned into the daily lives of the people we work with. That, friends, is what occupational therapy is about – helping people live full, rich lives doing what’s important to them.

Reyes, A. N., & Brown, C. A. (2016). Occupational therapists’ pain knowledge: A national survey. Disability and Rehabilitation: An International, Multidisciplinary Journal, 38(13), 1309-1317.

Rochman D, Herbert P. Rehabilitation professionals knowledge and attitudes regarding pain (COBS). Accessed 18 March 2015. Available from: http://prc.coh.org/html/rehab_professionals.htm.

When it hurts – but it’s important to keep doing


To date, despite years of research and billions of dollars, there is no satisfactory way to reduce pain in all people. In fact, our pain reduction treatments for many forms of persistent pain are pretty poor whether we look at pharmaceuticals, surgery, psychological treatments or even exercise. What this means is there are a lot of disillusioned and frustrated people in our communities – yet life carries on, and people do keep doing!

In an effort to understand what might help people who don’t “find a cure”, researchers and clinicians have been looking at mediators. Mediators are factors that explain a relationship between two variables. In the study I’m examining today, the predictor is pain intensity, and the criterion variable is participating in valued life activities (the things we want or need to do). The research question was whether self-efficacy and/or pain acceptance mediated engaging in valued life activities.

Ahlstrand, Vaz, Falkmer, Thyberg and Bjork (2017) used a cross-sectional study to explore relationships between the variables above in a group of people with rheumatoid arthritis (RA), drawn from three rheumatology registers in South East Sweden. Participants were required to have confirmed RA; be between 18 – 80 years; have had RA for four years or more; and have data included in the quality register – a total of 737 people agreed to take part (from a total of 1277 meeting entry criteria).

The researchers used the Swedish versions of Health Assessment Questionnaire (Wolfe, 1989) to establish degree of difficulty in daily activities, as well as the Valued Life Activities scale (Katz, Morris & Yellin, 2006); the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale (Lorig, Chastain, Ung, Shoor & Holman, 1989); and the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (Wicksell, Olsson & Melin, 2009).
The statistical analyses included Chi-square tests of independence to identify significant differences in categorical factors due to gender, and steps were taken to establish whether there were gender differences for pain acceptance, self-efficacy and valued life activities. Pearson correlations were used to explore the relationships between acceptance, self efficacy and the valued life activities summary score, and then univariate regressions were undertaken to test each individual factor (eg pain, pain acceptance and self efficacy on valued life activities). Then, only the significant contributors in univariate analyses where entered into the hierarchical linear regression models. The tests were to establish whether self-efficacy would predict valued life activities after acceptance and pain scores were considered.

Finally, structural equation modelling was used to examine the contribution and influence of pain, activity engagement and self-efficacy on difficulties performing valued life activities. A note here: The authors used the structure of the ICF model to name the constructs in their structural equation model.

What did they find?

The people who responded to this survey tended to be less active than those who were on the registers but didn’t respond, so we need to keep this in mind when we interpret their results. They found that women reported slightly more pain than men, but there were no differences between men and women on all measures except that men scored more highly on the symptom control subscale of the self-efficacy measure. A point to note here is that, unlike the Pain Self Efficacy Questionaire, this measure includes attempts to reduce or control pain and/or disability, so it’s a slightly different construct from the PSEQ which measures confidence to engage in doing things despite the pain.

In terms of pain, pain acceptance, and arthritis self-efficacy, there were low to moderate associations between these and engaging in valued life activities. In fact, all pain acceptance and self-efficacy constructs measured in this study were associated with performing valued life activities. In other words, when people are confident, and willing to do things and engage in activities despite pain, the more valued activities they actually do. In fact, one of the more striking findings was a negative relationship between activity engagement and performing valued life activities – those with lower activity engagement scores reported great difficult engaging in what was important to them (not especially surprising given that both scales are about doing what’s important and getting on with life).

Now for the really geeky model: structural equation modeling found a rather complex relationship between all the variables – so complex I’m going to include the diagram.

What does it show? Well, there’s a relationship between pain intensity and valued activity engagement – the more pain, the less people do what’s important. BUT this is mediated by “personal factors” (remember the ICF labels). These personal factors are the pain acceptance activity engagement, self-efficacy for pain and self-efficacy for symptoms. Interestingly, pain willingness, the other subscale on the pain acceptance scale, wasn’t correlated.

Or is it surprising? To my mind there are some interesting conceptual issues with this study. Firstly, in a group that is self-selected and represents slightly more disability than those who didn’t respond, it’s not surprising that pain intensity and disability were correlated. This is something we see often pre-treatment in chronic pain settings. It’s also no surprise to me that the Arthritis self-efficacy scales were associated with valued activities, and with activity engagement – the arthritis self-efficacy scales ask “How certain are you that you can decrease your pain quite a bit?”; “How certain are you that you can that you can make a small-to moderate reduction in your arthritis pain by using methods other than taking extra medication?” amongst other questions. These suggest that pain reduction is a primary aim in arthritis management. The Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire, however, is a very different beast. The Activity Engagement scale is about doing things that are valued (similar to the Valued Life Activity scale), while the  Willingness scale is about being willing to live life again despite pain – for example “I am getting on with the business of living no matter what my level of pain is.”; “It’s not necessary for me to control my pain in order to handle my life well.”.

While the authors argue that this study shows the value of self efficacy, stating “Active management promotes a sense of confidence, or self-efficacy, for dealing with pain that is associated with improved participation in daily activities and wellbeing.” I think the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale’s focus on controlling pain and other symptoms is incompatible with the constructs implied in the CPAQ. The ACT (Acceptance and Commitment Therapy) approach to pain is, as I’ve mentioned many times, a focus on engaging in valued activities irrespective of pain intensity – a more achievable goal for many than becoming confident to reduce pain as the ASES measures.

To their credit, the authors also indicate that men and women who continue to experience pain despite optimal medical treatment might benefit from strategies to increase their confidence to manage their own symptoms – but that a focus on pain control instead of participation despite pain is probably unhelpful. They go on to say that “by focusing on pain aceptance and activity engagement despite pain, self-management strategies may change the focus from pain control to a more flexible engagement in valued activities.” I couldn’t agree more – and I wish they’d used the Pain Self Efficacy Questionnaire instead of the ASES in this study. Maybe we need more discussion about appropriate measures in rheumatology research.

 

Ahlstrand, I., Vaz, S., Falkmer, T., Thyberg, I., & Björk, M. (2017). Self-efficacy and pain acceptance as mediators of the relationship between pain and performance of valued life activities in women and men with rheumatoid arthritis. Clinical Rehabilitation, 31(6), 824-834. doi:10.1177/0269215516646166

Katz PP, Morris A and Yelin EH. (2006). Prevalence and predictors of disability in valued life activities among individuals with rheumatoid arthritis. Annals of Rheumatology Diseases. 65: 763–769.

Lorig K, Chastain RL, Ung E, Shoor S and Holman HR. (1989). Development and evaluation of a scale to measure perceived self-efficacy in people with arthritis. Arthritis & Rheumatism, 32(1): 37–44.

Wicksell RK, Olsson GL and Melin L. (2009). The Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (CPAQ)-further validation including a confirmatory factor analysis and a comparison with the Tampa Scale of Kinesiophobia. European Journal of Pain, 13: 760–768.

Wolfe F. (1989). A brief clinical health assessment instrument: CLINHAQ. Arthritis & Rheumatism,  32 (suppl): S9

Thinking the worst – and willingness to do things despite pain


Catastrophising, perhaps more than any other psychological construct, has received pretty negative press from people living with pain. It’s a construct that represents a tendency to “think the worst” when experiencing pain, and I can understand why people who are in the middle of a strong pain bout might reject any idea that their minds might be playing tricks on them. It’s hard to stand back from the immediacy of “OMG that really HURTS” especially when, habitually, many people who have pain try so hard to pretend that “yes everything is really all right”. At the same time, the evidence base for the contribution that habitually “thinking the worst” has on actually increasing the report of pain intensity, increasing difficulty coping, making it harder to access effective ways around the pain, and on the impact pain has on doing important things in life is strong (Quartana, Campbell & Edwards, 2009).

What then, could counter this tendency to feel like a possum in the headlights in the face of strong pain? In the study I’m discussing today, willingness to experience pain without trying to avoid or control that experience, aka “acceptance”, is examined, along with catastrophising and measures of disability. Craner, Sperry, Koball, Morrison and Gilliam (2017) recruited 249 adults who were seeking treatment at an interdisciplinary pain rehabilitation programme (at tertiary level), and examined a range of important variables pre and post treatment.  Participants in the programme were on average 50 years old, mainly married, and white (not a term we’d ever use in New Zealand!). They’d had pain for an average of 10.5 years, and slightly less than half were using opioids at the time of entry to the programme.

Occupational therapists administered the Canadian Occupational Performance Measure, an occupational therapist-administered, semi-structured interview designed to assess a person’s performance and satisfaction with their daily activities (Law, Baptiste, McColl, Opzoomer, Polatajko & Pollock, 1990). The performance scale was used in this study, along with the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire (one of my favourites – McCracken, Vowles & Eccelston, 2004); the Pain Catastrophising Scale (Sullivan, Bishop & Pivik, 1995), The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (Kroenke, Spitzer & Williams, 2001); and The Westhaven-Yale Multidimensional Pain Inventory (Kerns, Turk & Rudy, 1985).

Now here’s where the fun begins, because there is some serious statistical analysis going on! Hierarchical multiple regression analyses is not for the faint-hearted – read the info about this approach by clicking the link. Essentially, it is a way to show if variables of your interest explain a statistically significant amount of variance in your Dependent Variable (DV) after accounting for all other variables. Or, in this study, what is the relationship between pain catastrophising, acceptance and pain severity – while controlling for age, gender, opioids use, and pain duration. The final step was to enter a calculation of the interaction between catastrophising and acceptance, and to enter this into the equation as the final step. A significant interaction suggests one of these two moderates the other – and this is ultimately captured by testing the slopes of the graphs. Complex? Yes – but a good way to analyse these complex relationships.

Results

Unsurprisingly, pain catastrophising and acceptance do correlate – negatively. What this means is that the more a person thinks the worst about their pain, the less willing they are to do things that will increase their pain, or to do things while their pain is elevated. Makes sense, on the surface, but wait there’s more!

Pain catastrophizing was significantly (ps < .01) and positively correlated with greater perceived pain intensity, pain interference, distress due to pain, and depression – and negatively correlated with occupational therapist-rated functioning. Further analysis found that only pain catastrophising (not acceptance) was associated with pain severity, while both catastrophising and acceptance predicted negative effect (mood) using the WHYMPI, but when the analysis used the PHQ-9, both pain catastrophising and pain acceptance uniquely predicted depressive symptoms.  When pain interference was used as the dependent variable, pain acceptance uniquely predicted the amount of interference participants experienced, rather than catastrophising. The final analysis was using the performance subscale of the COPM, finding that pain acceptance was a predictor, while catastrophising was not.

What does all this actually mean?

Firstly, I found it interesting that values weren’t used as part of this investigation, because when people do daily activities, they do those they place value on, for some reason. For example, if we value other people’s opinions, we’re likely to dress up a bit, do the housework and maybe bake something if we have people come to visit. This study didn’t incorporate contexts of activity – the why question. I think that’s a limitation, however, examining values is not super easy, however it’s worth keeping this limitation in mind when thinking about the results.

The results suggest that when someone is willing to do something even if it increases pain, or while pain is elevated, this has an effect on their performance, disability, the interference they experience from pain, and their mood.

The results also suggest that catastrophising, while an important predictor of pain-related outcomes, is moderated by acceptance.

My question now is – what helps someone to be willing to do things even when their pain is high? if we analyse the CPAQ items, we find things like “I am getting on with the business of living no matter what my level of pain is.”;  “It’s not necessary for me to control my pain in order to handle my life well.”; and “My life is going well, even though I have chronic pain.”. These are important areas for clinicians to address during treatment. They’re about life – rather than pain. They’re about what makes life worth living. They’re about who are you, what does your life stand for, what makes you YOU, and what can you do despite pain. And these are important aspects of pain treatment: given none of us can claim a 100% success rate for pain reduction. Life is more than the absence of pain.

 

 

Craner, J. R., Sperry, J. A., Koball, A. M., Morrison, E. J., & Gilliam, W. P. (2017). Unique contributions of acceptance and catastrophizing on chronic pain adaptation. International Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 24(4), 542-551.

Kerns IVRD,TurkDC, Rudy TE. (1985) West Haven-Yale Multidimensional Pain Inventory (WHYMPI). Pain. 23:345–56.

Kroenke K, Spitzer RL, Williams JB. The PHQ-9: validity of a brief depression severity measure. Journal of General Internal Medicine. 16(9), 606-13.

Law M, Baptiste S, McColl M, Opzoomer A, Polatajko H, Pollock N. (1990). The Canadian Occupational Performance Measure: an outcome measure for occupational therapy. Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy. 57(2), pp82–7.

McCracken LM, Vowles KE, Eccleston C. (2004). Acceptance of chronic pain: component analysis and a revised assessment method. Pain. 107(1–2), pp159–66.

Quartana PJ, Campbell CM, Edwards RR. (2009) Pain catastrophizing: a critical review. Expert Reviews in Neurotherapy, 9, pp 745–58.

SullivanMLJ, Bishop SR, Pivik J. (1995). The Pain Catastrophizing Scale: development and validation. Psychological Assessment. 7:524–32.

One-session instruction in pacing doesn’t work


If there’s one form of coping strategy that occupational therapists love, it has to be the idea of “pacing”. Of course, the concept of pacing is vexed: we don’t have a good definition that’s widely accepted so it’s difficult to know whether we’re doin’ it right, but the idea of chunking down the amount of activity carried out at any one time is widely used as one way for people to sustain activity involvement despite pain and fatigue.

Today I’m looking at an old paper (from 2016) where people with osteoarthritis (hip or knee) were given instruction in time-based activity pacing by an occupational therapist. Surprisingly, this was a three-arm randomised controlled study, where 193 people were randomised into tailored activity pacing, general activity pacing, or usual care. I say surprisingly because RCT’s are fairly rare in occupational therapy research in persistent pain, and nigh on impossible to get funding for (sigh).

The definition of pacing used in this study was “the regulation of activity level and/or rate in the service of an adaptive goal or goals” (Nielson, Jensen, Karsdorp & Vlaeyen, 2013) although the form of pacing offered by clinicians working in this field is still unclear. In this study, the “tailored” group underwent seven days of monitoring using an accelerometer, the results were downloaded, analysed and an individualised pacing plan developed by the therapists. The plan was intended to highlight times when the person had high or low levels of activity (as compared with their own average, and averages drawn from previous studies of people with the same diagnosis), and to point out associations between these activity levels and self reported symptoms. Participants were then provided with ideas for changing their activity levels to optimise their ability to sustain activity and minimise symptom fluctuation.

In the “general” pacing group, participants were given the same sorts of instructions, but instead of using objective data from their own activities, they were asked to recall their past situations and symptoms, and broad guidelines were given instead. Both groups had three sessions with comparable educational material.

In the usual care group, participants were instructed to carry on with their usual approach to activity, and were assessed at baseline, 10 weeks and six months, using the same assessment process as those in the experimental arms.

Outcome measures were fatigue, measured by the Brief Fatigue Inventory (Mendoza, Wang, Cleeland, Morrissey, Johnson, Wendt & Huber, 1999); and the 8-item PROMIS fatigue short form. Pain severity was measured using the pain subscale drawn from the WOMAC. Additional measures included the 6-minute walk test; the WOMAC physical disability short form scale; the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale; the CES-D depression measure, and various demographic and disease measures (joint space narrowing, osteophyte formation etc). Finally, to determine activity pacing adherence, the pacing subscale of the Chronic Pain Coping Inventory was used (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Strom, 1995).

What did they find?

Well, you may have guessed from the title of this post: although people given the pacing intervention said they benefited, and they changed the way they carried out daily activities, the results showed that although they did so, the only significant change on measures taken was for WOMAC pain, in which the people in the general pacing group reduced their pain over the first 10 weeks. BUT participants in the usual care group reduced their pain over six months!

What does this mean?

Should we all throw out the idea of paced activities? Should occupational therapists despair and go back to the drawing board?

I don’t think so, and here’s why.

I think targeting pain intensity is possibly the wrong outcome in a study like this. We already have a vast collection of studies showing that pain intensity and disability are not well-correlated. Pain intensity alone isn’t the main reason people stop doing things when they have osteoarthritis – it’s often fear that the pain signifies “bone on bone” and “wear and tear” and “cartilage disintegration” (Hendry, Williams, Markland, Wilkinson & Maddison, 2006). And we also know that people with osteoarthritis develop their own self-management strategies and that these focus on maintaining everyday social roles and valued activities (Morden, Jinks, Bie Nio, 2011). Values seem to help people engage in demanding activities, whether the demands are because the activities hurt, or they’re physically demanding, or they’re not our favourite thing to do (think vacuum cleaning when Mum is coming to visit!) (McCracken & Keogh, 2009).

Perhaps, by drawing attention to both activities and pain intensity, the therapists in this study created a situation where pain intensity became more salient to the participants. Perhaps, too, aiming to reduce pain doesn’t take into account the other values people may hold. For example, even if I’m sore I’ll rush around cleaning if I know my parents (or other visitors) are coming to visit. My pain intensity matters less than feeling embarrassed at an untidy house.

I think we need to revisit the aims of pacing activity. To me there are several reasons for having the strategy available when/if needed:

  1. If I want to work consistently at something that’s going to take a week or two to do. Example: I recently laid bricks under my cherry tree. I did this over three weekends because digging into really hard soil, heaving bags of sand, and placing the bricks is something that increases my pain quite a lot. Because I have other things to achieve over the weekend and during the week, and laying the bricks wasn’t a top priority, I chose to do about a metre square each day of each weekend.
  2. If I’m aiming to do something quite demanding – like go on a two-day tramp (hike). I’ll try to build my activity tolerance over similar terrain with similar loads in advance of the actual trip.
  3. If I really loathe the job and would otherwise avoid it… For example, vacuuming and mopping my floors. I’ll do a room at a time because I seriously do not enjoy housework!

Looking at activity management in isolation from what a person believes is important makes this strategy pretty unpalatable. Combine it with values, and we’re starting to see something that can be employed flexibly and when it’s workable.

 

Hendry, M., Williams, N. H., Markland, D., Wilkinson, C., & Maddison, P. (2006). Why should we exercise when our knees hurt? A qualitative study of primary care patients with osteoarthritis of the knee. Family Practice, 23(5), 558-567.

Jensen MP, Turner JA, Romano JM, Strom SE. (1995). The Chronic Pain Coping Inventory: development and preliminary validation. PAIN ;60, 203–16.

McCracken, L. M., & Keogh, E. (2009). Acceptance, mindfulness, and values-based action may counteract fear and avoidance of emotions in chronic pain: An analysis of anxiety sensitivity. The Journal of Pain, 10(4), 408-415. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2008.09.015

Mendoza TR, Wang XS, Cleeland CS, Morrissey M, Johnson BA, Wendt JK, Huber SL. (1999). The rapid assessment of fatigue severity in cancer patients: use of the Brief Fatigue Inventory. Cancer 85, 1186–96.

Murphy, S. L., Kratz, A. L., Kidwell, K., Lyden, A. K., Geisser, M. E., & Williams, D. A. (2016). Brief time-based activity pacing instruction as a singular behavioral intervention was not effective in participants with symptomatic osteoarthritis. Pain, 157(7), 1563-1573.

Morden, A., Jinks, C., & Bie Nio, O. (2011). Lay models of self-management: How do people manage knee osteoarthritis in context? Chronic Illness, 7(3), 185-200.

Nielson WR, Jensen MP, Karsdorp PA, Vlaeyen JW. (2013). Activity pacing in chronic pain: concepts, evidence, and future directions. Clinical Journal of Pain, 29, 461–8.

Persson, D., Andersson, I., & Eklund, M. (2011). Defying aches and revaluating daily doing: Occupational perspectives on adjusting to chronic pain. Scandinavian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 18(3), 188-197. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/11038128.2010.509810

One way of using a biopsychosocial framework in pain management – ii


Last week I discussed case formulation as one way of using a biopsychosocial framework in pain management, and I reviewed Benedetti’s description of the process of becoming aware that something’s wrong, seeking relief from that discomfort, then the “meet the therapist moment”, and finally the “receiving the therapy” steps along the way. Benedetti considers this within a neurobiological model (Benedetti, 2013), while Engel (1977) used general systems theory to frame his critique of the original biomedical model.

This week I want to look at a behavioural model. I do this partly because I think it’s been a long time since this model was brought into our discussions about pain and pain behaviour, and I do it because I think we can understand a great deal about why different people respond differently to their pain when we look at behaviour alone – before we even begin to look at beliefs or attitudes about pain.

Let’s do a little revision (Psych 101). In a behavioural model, we’re looking at two main forms of conditioning: Pavlovian or classical conditioning, and operant or instrumental conditioning. In the case of pain, we also need to revisit the distinction made between the experience (pain), and our behavioural response to that experience (pain behaviours). Pain behaviours are typically filtered or influenced by what we think is going on (judgements about the meaning of pain – eg super-scary crumbling back, or I just did too much gardening), what we’ve learned to do, and the context in which we’re experiencing pain. That context can be current (eg I’m in Church and it’s very quiet so I’d better not swear as I hit my toe against the pew!), or past (eg last time I kicked my toe against the pew and swore, everyone looked at me – how embarrassing!), or even future (eg if I swear when I kick my toe against the pew, I’ll never be able to show my face here again!). It’s the learned part I want to discuss today.

Pain behaviours range from reflex withdrawal responses (lifting the foot up while straightening the other leg to support me when I stand on a tack), to quite complex behaviours we’ve learned are relevant in our environment (filling out a claim form for compensation and treatment).

We probably developed pain behaviours as part of our evolutionary development: the reflex withdrawal behaviours don’t require conscious thought, so they begin in infancy (actually, before), and rely on spinal mechanisms (eg Rohrbach, Zeiter, Andersen, Wieling & Spadavecchia, 2014), with various parts of the brain becoming involved as part of strategies to avoid threat (see Damasio and Damasio (2016) for some insights into evolutionary aspects of withdrawal reflex). But because we have a developed cortex, we’ve learned ways of suppressing our responses, depending on social context – and on responses from others around us.

Reflexive responses are those associated with classical conditioning – and lead us to learn relationships between previously non-threatening stimuli and both withdrawal responses and the physiological arousal that goes with them. For example, if I bend over to make the bed and OUCH! my back suddenly gets really sore. I straighten up very carefully – and I’ve learned something: next time I bend over to make the bed, I’ll be remembering and preparing for that OUCH! to happen once again. The bed and bending forward movement become associated, in my mind, with that OUCH! Of course, for most of us, once we make the bed a few more times (make that many times), we’ll learn that OUCH! doesn’t inevitably follow the bend, so we gain confidence to repeat that movement without preparing for the OUCH! Now what do you think might happen if I never had an opportunity to make the bed again? Say, if I have a really protective person in my life who stopped me every time I go to do it – will that association I have in my mind persist, or will it reduce? This is, in essence, what is thought to happen when someone develops so-called “fear avoidance”. Note: the experience of pain does not have to re-occur for me to avoid bending and begin to rev my nervous system up. What needs to happen is for the first instance to be pretty strong, and for me to not test my belief again. It’s the behaviour that persists (avoidance) because by avoiding something I believe will be OUCH! I avoid experiencing OUCH! And by avoiding that experience, I never test whether OUCH! happens every time, or just that once.

Let’s look at the other really powerful learning mechanism: operant conditioning. In this situation, the likelihood of me repeating my behaviour is increased or reduced, depending on responses in the environment. So, let’s take my bending forward and experiencing OUCH! If my partner (bless him) then decided to fuss over me, make me a cup of tea and tell me not to worry about making the bed ever again – AND if I liked that idea – my response is likely to be to avoid making the bed. I might even go as far as wincing a bit when walking, so he makes me another cup of tea and fusses over me. I might talk about my back pain because he’s so concerned about me (or I really want him to be concerned about me) and if he carries on fussing, I’m likely to carry on with these behaviours. Now picture that in a two-year-old kid – every time the kid trips and cries, some concerned parent comes picks him up, something the kid likes, it’s probable that kid will learn that this is normal, and something to do when he hurts. For more on learning theory, Johan Vlaeyen summarises the state of play in a review paper from 2015 (Vlaeyen, 2015).

We’re smart, us humans. We learn to predict and remember patterns even from imprecise data – it doesn’t take much for us to put two and two together, particularly when it’s something relevant to surviving! Whenever I’m listening to someone telling me their story about why they’re presenting in this way at this time, and what is maintaining their situation, I keep thinking about the various learning mechanisms involved. Social context and the people around us and how they respond to us exert a powerful force on what we do – and many times we’re not even aware of why we do what we do.  Knowing this stuff means that when I’m listening to someone’s story I try very hard to factor in those things that may have influenced what the person does, rather than just thinking the person is aware of doing all they are doing.

 

Benedetti, F. (2013). Placebo and the new physiology of the doctor-patient relationship. Physiological Reviews, 93(3), 1207-1246. doi:10.1152/physrev.00043.2012

Damasio, A., & Damasio, H. (2016). Pain and other feelings in humans and animals. Animal Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling, 1(3), 33.

Engel, G. L. (1977). The need for a new medical model: A challenge for biomedicine. Science, 196(4286), 129-136.

Rohrbach, H., Zeiter, S., Andersen, O. K., Wieling, R., & Spadavecchia, C. (2014). Quantitative assessment of the nociceptive withdrawal reflex in healthy, non-medicated experimental sheep. Physiology & behavior, 129, 181-185.
Vlaeyen, J. W. (2015). Learning to predict and control harmful events: Chronic pain and conditioning. Pain, 156, S86-S93.

One way of using a biopsychosocial framework in pain management – i


While a biopsychosocial ‘model’ (or sociopsychobiological framework) has been widely adopted when attempting to understand pain, many critics argue that it just doesn’t give clinicians a clear way to integrate or prioritise clinical information and generate treatments. The ‘model’ itself has been challenged from many angles – it’s too complex, too simplistic, relies on Bertalanffy’s “general systems theory” which has itself been challenged, it’s too “fuzzy”, and of course there are many who think that psychological and sociocultural aspects of human experience are epiphenomena while will ultimately be boiled down to cellular or biological processes. Nevertheless, this framework also has considerable appeal, is widely adopted and I think can provide us with some useful heuristics for thinking about how and why a person presents in the way they do at the time they do – and helps us consider what can be done to reduce distress and disability.

Disclaimer: I work with the “fuzzy” sociopsychological aspects of pain management, and leave a great deal of the biological to those who focus on that – and believe me, the biological is usually done and done to the nth degree in most cases of persistent pain. I rarely see someone who hasn’t had their scans, Xrays, physical examinations, bloods, urine, nerve conduction, surgery, exercise or whatever looked at – but plenty of people who have never once been asked what they think is going on and what their main concern is. Oh and not had their sleep, mood, alcohol and other substance use, daily routines, relationships, work situation, community and spiritual aspects of life ever discussed. So, despite the constant banging on about “don’t forget the bio” – I really do not think this is a thing.

Where do we start with this approach?

The first place I start with my discussions is to ask “Tell me about your problems with pain.” What I’m focusing on in this discussion is when did the person first recognise that there was “something wrong” – and then what did they do about it.

Fabricio Benedetti talks about the neurobiological processes involved in a person detecting that he or she is “unwell”. He writes: “Physiology and neuroscience have a lot to say about feeling sick, for it involves sensory systems that convey different pieces of information related to peripheral organs and apparatuses, as well as brain regions that lead to conscious awareness.” (Benedetti, 2013). To me, this involves biological, psychological and social factors for when does a person recognise that “conscious awareness” means something? Benedetti goes on to say “The second step is what makes a patient “seek relief,” a kind of motivated behavior that is aimed at suppressing discomfort. This behavioral repertoire is not different from that aimed at suppressing hunger or thirst, and the brain reward mechanisms are crucial in this regard” (Benedetti, 2013). Judgements about what internal experiences mean may begin with a reflex response (automatic and based on evolutionary demands to keep safe) but what we DO about those experiences depends a great deal on what we learn from others. The people we most draw from are those around us – mother, father, siblings, people in our immediate family and extended family. And over time, the social nature of humans means we also consider the community in which we live – and wider with social media! Judgements, or appraisals (thoughts and beliefs about the meaning of these internal experiences) are, ‘fraid to say, psychological in nature. While the influences on thoughts and beliefs are – you guessed it – social.

So, how can a clinician use this information? Where’s the research? Come on – science it up woman!!

If it’s not enough to know that there are neurobiological factors underpinning our internal experience, and motivated behaviour is tied up with reward systems, then what else can we use to understand the processes of feeling ill and seeking treatment? To me, the natural first step is to look at learning mechanisms. Yep, very basic Psych 101 classical and operant conditioning mechanisms. Add in a dash of social learning theory (how we learn from watching and talking with others) and we have some rather useful experimentally-validated hypotheses to work with.

What do I mean by this?

Well, at least part of clinical reasoning is a process of recognising potential explanations for the phenomena we see. My take on clinical reasoning is that we can use case formulation to help generate a series of hypotheses to explain why a person is coming to see us in this way at this time – and what might be maintaining their current situation. In case formulation we can use “abductive reasoning” (recognising a potential “rule” or class of behaviour from a specific observation – eg we can postulate that a person’s sleep disturbance might be due to low mood, sleep apnoea, habit, operant conditioning, or a new baby, and we’ll probably collect some more information to test each of these possible explanations before deciding on the most probable reason). If we know a whole bunch of research around what humans do when they’re feeling sore and vulnerable, we are able to come up with a bunch of possible reasons for someone noticing they feel unwell, judging it in a certain way, and then deciding to do something about it.

For example, we know from research studies that people who have had adverse experiences in early childhood have a greater risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic pain (eg Afari, Ahumada, Wright, Lostoufi, Golnari, Reis & Cuneo, 2014; Jones, Power & Macfarlane, 2009). We also know that those people may develop weaker attachments to others and so feel vulnerable in relationships where high levels of trust are needed – also linked to the presence of persistent pain – and adversely affecting outcomes from multidisciplinary pain management programmes (Anno, Shibata, Ninomiya, Iwaki, Kawata, Sawamoto et al., 2015; Kowal, McWilliams, Peloquin, Wilson, Henderson & Fergusson, 2015).

These factors might mean that when we ask someone about their theory for why they have persistent pain, or what they think is going on, we might keep an ear open to listen for threats to relationships around the time of the onset of the problem dealing with pain (especially if the pain has been present for a while but the person hasn’t been looking for treatment until just now). We might also be thinking hard about the neurobiological effects of relationship breakups and how this might impinge on either coping (eg accessing strategies to manage effectively during painful experiences) or on stress responses (eg heightened vigilance to threat).

Two things: (1) This doesn’t mean persistent pain is “psychological” – it’s not, but these experiences might set the scene for neurobiological changes, both in “set-point” for threat and in resilience for dealing with threat. (2) This also doesn’t mean that we need to deal with the response to relationship stress ourselves – it might mean we listen respectfully, and bear this vulnerability in mind during our interactions, being careful not to threaten trust, and work hard to retain a sense of warmth/empathy as well as competence for this person.

Next time: More on learning theory and how these might influence the way we look at why someone seeks treatment with us, and why at this time, and what may be maintaining the behaviours we see.

 

Afari N, Ahumada SM, Wright LJ, Mostoufi S, Golnari G, Reis V, Cuneo JG., (2014). Psychological trauma and functional somatic syndromes: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychosomatic Medicine, 76, 2-11.

Anno, K., Shibata, M., Ninomiya, T., Iwaki, R., Kawata, H., Sawamoto, R., . . . Hosoi, M. (2015). Paternal and maternal bonding styles in childhood are associated with the prevalence of chronic pain in a general adult population: The hisayama study. BMC Psychiatry, 15(1), 181. doi:10.1186/s12888-015-0574-y

Benedetti, F. (2013). Placebo and the new physiology of the doctor-patient relationship. Physiological Reviews, 93(3), 1207-1246. doi:10.1152/physrev.00043.2012

Jones GT, Power C, Macfarlane GJ, (2009). Adverse events in childhood and chronic widespread pain in adult life: Results from the 1958 British Birth Cohort Study. Pain 143:92-96.

Kowal, J., McWilliams, L. A., Péloquin, K., Wilson, K. G., Henderson, P. R., & Fergusson, D. A. (2015). Attachment insecurity predicts responses to an interdisciplinary chronic pain rehabilitation program. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 38(3), 518-526. doi:10.1007/s10865-015-9623-8

What should healthcare professionals learn?


I was lucky enough to spend two days attending the Placebo Symposium in Sydney in November this year – what an experience! A lineup of the cream of researchers exploring placebo and contextual responses (meaning responses) – all were excellent speakers and the focus was on both research and what this means to clinicians. If you’re keen to watch all you can for free over the next two weeks – click here: www.placebo.armchairmedical.tv.

At the end of the symposium, the speakers were asked a question by artist Eugenie Lee what subjects they would want taught if they had all the facilities and students with top class skills attending. This is what they said (it’s the Lennox Thompson translation, any mis-translations are entirely my responsibility):

  • Inform students about the contextual effects of every single clinical encounter and treatment
  • Help them focus on supporting patients to develop helpful expectations about treatments
  • Read Stanislovski (A good doctor [healthcare professional] is about being a good actor)
  • Always remember: we’re treating people not tissues
  • Use words wisely (they can heal – and harm)
  • Listen to your patients (and show them you’re listening)
  • Interprofessionalism is a thing
  • Talk with your patients not at them
  • Train together with your allied health colleagues
  • Ignore “placebo” or contextual effects at your peril
  • “Placebo” will eventually die – but the effect of context lives on in every treatment
  • Communication skills training needs more than a taste – to learn these skills takes time and intensity
  • Emphasise not just empathy – but also competence – these two factors contribute enormously to the “meet the therapist moment” (generating a sense of trustworthiness)
  • Introduce neurobiology from the beginning of the course
  • Learn [much much much more] about pain throughout the programme – not just the neurobiological systems but the psychological and social
  • Develop greater understanding of research methodologies for studying treatments and their effects

What were my take-away points from this whole conference?

As a longtime convert to Dan Moerman’s re-labeling to meaning response of what we often call “placebo effect”, the key points I took away were these (and you’ll see them pop up again and again in my blogs I’m sure):

  • Every healthcare encounter involves four things: a person seeking help, a person hoping to deliver help, a treatment ritual, and a social context. These can’t be divided if we hope to understand the outcome of treatment.
    • We need to understand the person seeking help – how they identify their illness, how they frame recovery, what their main concern is, and the context in which they are experiencing their illness.
    • We need to understand the person hoping to deliver help – how they view their contribution, how they view the person seeking help, the way they frame their treatment, the context in which they’re given the authority to help, and how they frame recovery.
    • We need to explore the treatment ritual – from the packaging, the meaning (to both parties) of the artifacts, the procedures, the words and actions – all of these have meaning, as marketing companies undoubtedly know (and exploit).
    • We need to examine the social context – the communities in which we live, the way illness and wellbeing are defined, the way healing is understood, how treatments are recognised, the impact of language and interpretation of that language and the way language evolves over time, how communities view treatment seekers and treatment givers, historical understanding and how this influences who, what, why and how therapeutic interactions are enacted.
  • The psychological is underpinned [as much as we can detect for now] by neurobiology, at one level of analysis. Neurobiological processes are incredibly complex and we don’t understand them very well. As we do, many of the influences decried as “woolly” or “fluffy” by some of my colleagues are, I think, going to be uncovered and found to be extraordinarily complex interactions between neurobiological systems. And yes, they will be complex – beyond most mortal’s understanding. This doesn’t mean they’re woo, or that they can be disregarded.
  • A other levels of analysis, sociopsychological processes are incredibly important contributors to the way treatments are sought – and treatments have effects. This means we’re unlikely to understand them in any simplistic sense. So to deride these processes as irrelevant or “unscientific” simply because they don’t fit in with an existing model of cause and effect (particularly if they don’t fit with a simple 1+2+3=6 model) probably means there’s a lot of learning needed. Simply because an empirical basic science or RCT doesn’t show “what’s going on” does not mean the concept under study is “not science” – it just means a scientific methodology that accommodates these complexities is needed. Not everything can be reduced to an experimental design – qualitative research is valid for some very important questions.
  • Communication – what and how we express meaning to another, and how this is interpreted and responded to by that other – occurs everywhere and all the time. Whether we attend to it or not. Meaning-making is something humans just do. So maybe as health professionals we should invest rather more than we do in training ourselves to be skilled at communicating. This means recording our interactions, reviewing them, getting to know the effect of what we communicate and training ourselves to be just as careful with our communication as we are with prescribing anything else. Because it could be that our communication is the most potent ingredient in our treatment.

“A good listener is not only popular everywhere, but after a while he knows something.” —Wilson Mizner

What’s the biggest barrier to learning more?


Reading and engaging with clinicians online and face-to-face, it’s clear to me that effectively integrating psychosocial factors into daily clinical reasoning, especially amongst physical or manual therapists, is a real challenge. There’s enough research around showing how poorly these factors are identified and then factored in to change what we do and how we do it for me to be convinced of this. What intrigues me, though, is why – given psychosocial risk factors have, in NZ, been around since 1997 – it’s still a problem.

It’s not ignorance. It’s not holding an alternative viewpoint. It’s not just that clinical reasoning models don’t seem to integrate these factors, or that our original training kinda partitioned the various “bits” of being human off – I think that it’s probably that we think we’re already doing well enough.

Image result for dunning kruger effect

This effect has a name – Dunning-Kruger effect. Now, don’t be put off by this term, because I know in some social media circles it’s used to bash people who are  maybe naive, or haven’t realised their lack of knowledge, and it can feel really awful to be told “well actually you’re ignorant”, or “you’re inflating your skill level”.  The thing is, it’s a common experience – we all probably think we’re great car drivers – but in reality we’re all pretty average.

The same thing occurs when we consider our ability to be:

  • empathetic
  • responsive
  • good listeners
  • client-centred
  • collaborative

Another important effect found in clinicians is that we believe our experience as clinicians means we’re better at aspects of clinical care, and especially at clinical reasoning. Over time we get better at recognising patterns – but this can actually be a problem for us. Humans are excellent at detecting patterns but as a result we can jump to conclusions, have trouble stopping ourselves from fixating on the first conclusion we draw, begin looking for things to confirm our hunch, overlook things that don’t fit with the pattern we’ve identified, and basically we begin to use stereotypes rather than really looking at the unique person sitting in front of us (see Croskerry, Singhal & Mamede, 2013a, b).

The effect of these biases, and especially our bias towards thinking we do better than we actually do (especially regarding communication skills and psychosocial factors) means we’re often completely unaware of HOW we communicate, and HOW poorly we pick up on psychosocial factors.

So often I’ve heard people say “Oh I use intuition, I just pick up on these psychosocial issues” – but the problem is that (a) we’re likely to over-estimate how well we pick up on them and (b) our intuition is poor. The risk for our patients is that we don’t identify something important, or alternatively, that we label something as a psychosocial risk factor when it’s actually irrelevant to this person’s problem.

Clinical reasoning is difficult. While recognising patterns becomes easier over time because we have a far broader range of patterns we’ve seen before, at the same time

  • research is expanding all the time (we can be out of date)
  • we can get stuck prematurely identifying something that isn’t relevant
  • we get hooked in on things we’ve just read about, things that happen rarely, things that remind us of something or someone else

Hypothetico-deductive reasoning is an alternative approach to clinical reasoning. It’s an approach that suggests we hold some ideas about what’s going on in our mind while collecting more information to test whether this is the case. The problem here is that we look for information to confirm what we think is happening – rather than looking for something to disconfirm, or test, the hypothesis we hold. So, for example, we might observe someone’s pain behaviour and think to ourselves “oh that person is doing that movement because of a ‘dysfunctional movement pattern’. We can assume that the reason for this movement pattern is because of underlying dysfunction of some sort – but we fail to test that assumption out to see whether it might in fact be a movement pattern developed because someone told the person “this is the way you should move”, or the person is moving that way because of their beliefs about what might happen if they move differently.

The problem with intuition and these other cognitive biases is that they simplify our clinical reasoning, and they reduce effort, so they’re easy traps to fall into. What seems to help is slowing down. Deliberately putting a delay in between collecting information and making a decision. Holding off before deciding what to do. Concurrently, we probably need to rely less on finding “confirming” information – and FAR more on collecting information across a range of domains, some of which we may not think are relevant.

That’s the tough bit. What we think is relevant helps us narrow down our thinking – great for reducing the amount of information we need to collect, but not so great for testing whether we’ve arrived at a reasonable conclusion. My suggested alternative is to systematically collect information across all the relevant domains of knowledge (based on what’s been found in our research), wait a bit and let it settle – then and only then begin to put those bits and pieces together.

Why doesn’t it happen? Well, we over-estimate how well we do this assessment process. We do jump to conclusions and sometimes we’re right – but we wouldn’t know whether we were right or not because we don’t check out alternative explanations. We’re pushed by expectations from funders – and our clients – to “set goals” or “do something” at the very first assessment. We feel guilty if we don’t give our clients something to take away after our initial assessment. We want to look effective and efficient.

Great quote?

For every problem, there is a solution that is simple, elegant, and wrong. H.L. Mencken.

If you’d like to question your own practice, try this: Record your session – and transcribe that recording. Notice every time you jump in to give advice before you’ve really heard your client. Notice how quickly you form an impression. Examine how often you look for disconfirmation rather than confirmation. See how often you ask about, and explore, those psychosocial factors. It’s tough to do – and sobering – but oh how much you’ll learn.

Croskerry, P., Singhal, G., & Mamede, S. (2013). Cognitive debiasing 1: origins of bias and theory of debiasing. BMJ Quality & Safety, 22(Suppl 2), ii58-ii64. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001712

Croskerry, P., Singhal, G., & Mamede, S. (2013). Cognitive debiasing 2: impediments to and strategies for change. BMJ Quality & Safety, 22(Suppl 2), ii65-ii72. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2012-001713